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It is no secret of history that the principalities of government
and religion, when not producing oppression from their merger, are
necessarily generating friction from their separation. Likewise, it is
no secret of contemporary society that unresolved tensions between
religion and the state continue to surface and that we have yet to
arrive at any satisfactory concordance on the proper role of religion
in public life. Professor Stephen Carter, in The Culture of Disbelief,'
has done an admirable job documenting several of these current
tensions, particularly those arising from the confrontation of
religious devotion with our legal and political regime. According to
Carter, the contemporary rhetoric of political and doctrinal
neutrality, far from working a solution to these tensions, is actually
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a source of deprecation, alienation, and disenfranchisement for
many who take their religious beliefs seriously.2 Over the last few
decades, he argues, there has emerged a legal and political "culture
of disbelief"-one that prompts us "to belittle religious devotion, to
humiliate believers, and, even if indirectly, to discourage religion as
a serious activity," s one that "presses the religiously faithful to be
other than themselves, to act publicly, and sometimes privately as
well, as though their faith does not matter to them."4
Carter's words hardly bespeak a benevolent view of contemporary law and politics. Nor do they bode well for the future-that is,
unless we begin to "take religion seriously" as a central source of
understanding and moral reasoning for a majority of citizens and as
a necessary and beneficial component of our sociopolitical system.
In particular, Carter insists that religion be allowed to fulfill its
historic and functionally optimal role of checking the power and
policies of the state. According to Carter, religion is at its best, and
thus the state and society derive the most from it, when it serves as
a "mediating institution" between state and citizen-never in
substantial alliance with the former and always a potential source of
moral dissent for the latter. 5 In turn, we must evaluate religious
involvement in our legal and political culture, as well as religion's
special treatment under the First Amendment religion clauses, in
terms of this overarching rationale of institutional mediation. If
religion could be taken seriously in this way, he argues, we would
welcome the very religious participation in law and politics that
many have recently been prone to dismiss and even actively to
6
exclude.
Carter's message will no doubt strike many as appealing, if not
persuasive.7 Chapter by chapter, he provides his audience with an
e.g., p. 13 (stating that society has a "prejudice against religious devotion that
masquerades as 'neutrality'").
s P. 16.
2 See,

4 P. 3.

5 In Carter's words:
The idea of religion as independent moral force is crucial both to the
self-definition of faith and to the role of the religions as intermediate
institutions to which citizens owe a separate allegiance. As autonomous
intermediate institutions, the religions can work against the state; as
partners with the state, they cannot.
P. 39.
6 See p. 274 (maintaining that a state that values liberty and diversity should
"revel" in conflicts between religion and the state as signs of "political and spiritual
health").
7I

should admit my own predisposition to Professor Carter's work. Drawing in
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intuitively sound, historically grounded, and ultimately pragmatic
model for understanding and managing the relationship between
government and religion in an era when that relationship is less
than certain. Moreover, throughout the book he employs a kind of
self-referential narrative, sprinkled with vignettes in the style of
Lewis Thomas's Late Night Thoughts,' which should put most
readers at ease in this otherwise controversial, often alienating, area
of inquiry.' And Carter's uncommonly broad range of coveragefrom the place of religion in public education to its role in our
national debates over abortion, euthanasia, and the death penaltyshould indicate to readers that he is generally forthright and that
the strength of his arguments, in contrast to so much of the writing
in this area, is not derived simply from the selective avoidance of
reality. Taken as a whole, Carter's book should be greeted openlyas it was by President Clinton and those who mimic his reading
habitsl--if only for its candor and courage, two qualities so often
absent, and sometimes even discouraged, from our most important
public debates.
It is all the more troubling, then, that The Culture of Disbelieffails
in the one realm where it ought most to succeed, namely that of
law, and specifically that of the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment. What is more, the failure comes from within-an
internal limitation placed on and resulting from Carter's basic
theory regarding the proper relationship between religion and
government. Precisely because his theory justifies a special relationpart on his prior scholarship, I have addressed similar questions elsewhere. See Scott
C. Idleman, Ideology as Interpretation:A Reply to ProfessorGreene's Theory of the Religion
Clauses, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming May 1994) [hereinafter Idleman, Ideology
as Interpretation];Scott C. Idleman, Note, The Role of Religious Values in Judicial
Decision Making, 68 IND. L.J. 433 (1993) [hereinafter Idleman, Religious Values].
8

LEWIS THOMAS, LATE NIGHT THOUGHTS ON LISTENING TO MAHLER'S NINTH

SYMPHONY (1983) (providing, through the use of vignettes and the first person, a

series of philosophical reflections based on personal memories).
' In particular, and in contrast to the traditional style of legal academic
scholarship, he readily provides his personal views on even the most sensitive of
issues. When discussing classroom prayer, for example, he begins by disclosing to his
reader that "[p]rayer is a crucial part of our family life. We pray before important
events: meals, trips, sleep. We give thanks for our good fortune, pray for those less
fortunate, beg forgiveness for our sins, and ask forgiveness for the sins of others."
P. 185.
o See Kathy Lewis, Booked Up: Clinton's ReadingHabits Have Become a Hot Topic,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 4,1993, at IC (discussing President Clinton's voracious
reading habits); Kenneth L. Woodward, MakingRoom for Religion, NEWSWEEK, Sept.
20, 1993, at 56 (noting that President Clinton recommended Carter's book to an
audience of clergy).
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ship between religion and government in terms of social utility (that
is, in terms of religion's mediating value), it cannot logically justify

the presence or practice of religion when no such utility is produced. The shortcoming is particularly acute, moreover, in the
realm of free exercise, the very realm in which a special relationship
can have the greatest practical importance. Although Carter's
model would presumably give access to any religion seeking
participation in the political or legal processes (since at that
moment the religion would likely be serving its socially useful
checking function), there is little or no logical reason to extend the
same kind of presumptive protection to religious free exercise when
doing so would yield no obvious social benefit. In effect, we would
come full circle back to Employment Division v. Smith," but instead
of the false neutrality of unfettered democracy, there would
predominate the false neutrality of a theory that values religion
according to largely extrinsic and entirely secular criteria.
This Review Essay explores the substance and limits of Carter's
conceptual approach to religion and government in two Parts. Part
I provides both a summary and an assessment of the book, with
Sections A through D each covering one of his central descriptive
or prescriptive points. In addition, Section E addresses the possible
consequences of his theory in terms of how we as a culture discuss
and understand religion. Based on the analysis in this first Part, I
argue that Carter's theory of government-religion relations, while
generally sound, should absolutely not be extended to the free
exercise of religion. To do so would reduce religious liberty to a
mere tool of society and would construct the very culture of
disbelief that Carter seeks to prevent. Prompted by these concerns,
Part II fundamentally reexamines the concept of extending
constitutional protection to religious free exercise and considers a
number of criteria according to which the soundness of any free
exercise theory should be measured. In addition, Part II presents
an alternative theory of religious liberty grounded in the understanding that free exercise is an intrinsic good, one in need of no
external justification, including social utility. For a variety of

1 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that neutral, generally applicable laws thatburden
religious practices are, with limited exceptions, not subject to enhanced review). The
majority readily acknowledged that "leaving accommodation [of religious practices]
to the political process will place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices
that are not widely engaged in" but that this is simply an "unavoidable consequence
of democratic government." Id. at 890; see also infra text accompanying notes 119-22.

1994]

VALUING RELIGION

1317

reasons, this alternative theory has been increasingly neglected over
the last several decades,12 and Carter's avoidance of it is likely a
reflection of that trend. Nevertheless, the intrinsic worth theory
embodies a rich, liberty-protective vision of free exercise, a vision
that in part animated the framing of the Free Exercise Clause and
that for many religious citizens represents the heart, if not the soul,
of the First Amendment.
I. The Culture of Disbelief: A SUMMARY AND CRITIQUE
Carter divides The Culture ofDisbeliefinto three parts and a brief
postscript."3 Part I, comprising chapters 1 through 5, sets forth the
terms of the debate as well as the cultural backdrop against which
religion-in-politics issues play out-the institutional and spiritual
contexts from which religious concerns and positions emerge as well
as the legal, political, and social contexts into which they are placed.
Part II, comprising the next five chapters, addresses the specific
battles-especially the interplay between religion and public
education-that increasingly have taken on constitutional dimensions
by way of the First Amendment. Finally, part III, comprising the
last three chapters, discusses the liberal theoretical critique of
religion in the public square, 14 speaks to the potential role of
religion in our most controversial national debates, and provides
some final thoughts and speculations on the place of religion in our
democratic political order.
In turn, my assessment of the book proceeds in five Sections,
with each of the first four Sections providing both a synopsis and a
12 See Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional
Discourse, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 170-71 (1991) [hereinafter Smith, Rise and Fall]
(discussing the apparent prohibition on the use of a religious justification as a basis
for supporting the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom); Michael E. Smith,
The Special PlaceofReligion in the Constitution, 1983 SuP. CT. REV. 83, 116 [hereinafter
Smith, Special Place] (noting the tendency of some Supreme CourtJustices to view
"the religion worthy of being protected by the Constitution primarily as a secular
activity").
" The postscript discusses the Branch Davidian incident that occurred near Waco,
Texas, in the spring of 1993. See pp. 275-77.
14As used in this Essay, the term "public square" refers metaphorically to the
forums and institutions of cultural and political policy formulation, discussion, and
influence-the legislative floor, the town council meeting, the public schools and
universities, public events such as political conventions or parades, and perhaps even
the media. For further discussion of the meaning of this term, see Ruth G. Teitel,
PostmodernistArchitecturesin the Law of Religion, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 102-04 (1993)
(examining both the traditional architectural usage of the term and its contemporary
nonliteral political usage).
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critique of one or more of Carter's central ideas. Section A
evaluates Carter's empirical claim that we now have a "culture of
disbelief" and addresses several theses that he and other scholars
have offered to describe this culture. Section B, which is normatively the most important Section, sets forth Carter's overarching theory
of religion-government relations based on the role that religion can
serve as a mediating institution between citizen and state. Turning
to the constitutional realm, Sections C and D then address the
consequences of this theory in the contexts of the Establishment
and Free Exercise Clauses, respectively. In particular, Section D
highlights the shortcomings inherent in Carter's social utility-based
model when applied to religious free exercise. Finally, Section E
takes a sizeable step back and examines the possible adverse effects
of Carter's model on the ways we as a culture conceive of religion
15
and its relationship to our politics and law.
A. Is Ours Truly a "Culture of Disbelief?
Two fundamental questions persist throughout Carter's book.
First, does our legal and political regime truly comprise or engender
a "culture of disbelief-one that trivializes religious devotion?
Second, if so, does Carter ultimately provide a model that both
overcomes this culture and manages the interaction of religion and
government in a satisfactory way? Putting the second inquiry aside
for the moment, this first Section of the Essay asks whether Carter's
culture of disbelief actually exists, or whether it is merely some sort
of straw man or bogeyman, invoked to make the issues more
dramatic or the conclusions more compelling. Accordingly, I have
divided the question even further into three related inquires:
(1) what is the nature of Carter's proof for the culture of disbelief?.;
(2) what are the possible origins and causes of this culture?; and
(3) in an effort to refine Carter's proof, in what ways might we
conceptualize the elements of this culture? As I explain below, I
find the culture of disbelief inquiry entirely too complex and
subjective to yield a simple positive or negative response, and thus
' I should note that my emphasis, especially in Sections B through D, is more on
the theoretical and logical validity of Carter's model and less on its particular
applications, whether to parochial school funding under the Establishment Clause or

to sacramental peyote use under the Free Exercise Clause. These case studies are
clearly important, but they are merely the surface of the problem. As Carter's book
reveals, the ultimate issues are below that surface, and it is there that our efforts must

be focused.
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I necessarily call into question Carter's lack of a systematic methodology in approaching it. At the same time, this Review Essay will
suggest that a refinement of the inquiry into its several constituent
parts may help us to see that Carter's cultural indictment, though
probably overbroad, is hardly without merit and should certainly
prompt each reader to think seriously about the role of religion in
public life.
1. Evidence for the Culture of Disbelief
Our first question concerns the nature and substance of Carter's
proof for the existence of a culture of disbelief. Not surprisingly,
his evidence comes in a variety of forms-judicial decisions, lawsuits,
anecdotes, media accounts, statements by individuals and groups,
and his direct observation and interpretation of events. Carter
relates the stories of individuals and of institutions-from a
television commentator's critical reaction to Hillary Rodham
Clinton's wearing of a cross to a Supreme CourtJustice's unempathetic understanding of the Sabbath16 -which, he argues, "share a
common rhetoric that refuses to accept the notion that rational,
public-spirited people can take religion seriously.""7 At an individual level, for example, he offers the following tale:
A friend tells the story of how he showed his rdsum6 to an
executive search consultant-in the jargon, a corporate headhunter-who told him crisply that if he was serious about moving ahead
in the business world, he should remove from the rdsum6 any
mention of his involvement with a social welfare organization that
was connected with a church, but not one of the genteel mainstream denominations. Otherwise, she explained,
a potential
8
employer might think him a religious fanatic.'
An even more interesting form of personal evidence, and one
not necessarily apprehended by Carter himself, can be found in
Carter's apparent uneasiness about how his own religious beliefs
ought to figure into the book. In several instances, particularly
when raising sensitive issues such as abortion or school prayer,
Carter seems to feel compelled to annotate or preface his discussion
with a disclaimer to the effect that, despite his own religiosity,
readers need not fear because he really is a liberal or moderate.19
16 See

pp. 4-6.
P. 6.
P. 7. For a comment on Carter's use of this particular tale, see infra note 30.
19See, e.g., p. 78 (discussing the ordination of women); p. 223 (discussing
17
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Or, when advocating a relatively conservative view, he seems almost
apologetic in tone.2" While this dimension of the book has been
criticized elsewhere, 1 it is raised here because such apologetic
passages provide evidence, albeit circumstantial, of Carter's very
own thesis at work. Indeed, despite his repeated pleas that the
merit of one's expression should derive from its content and not its
religious underpinnings,2 2 one senses that Carter himself is fearful
that his own religiosity, unless qualified as politically palatable, will
somehow affect the legitimacy of his treatment of these highly
sensitive issues.
While these individual accounts are interesting, however, the
vast majority of Carter's evidence derives from the deeds and
pronouncements of culturally influential or elite institutions, such
as the U.S. Supreme Court, the media, and the scientific community. Regarding members of the media, for instance, Carter contends
that when addressing religion in public life, particularly conservative
religion, they tend to display the very kind of intolerance of which
they accuse religious political participants-whether it is their
likening the 1992 Republican National Convention to the Salem
witch trials or their poking fun at, rather than recognizing as sacred,
a joint marriage ceremony conducted by the Reverend Sun Myung
Moon's Unification Church.2 ' Likewise, Carter takes the scientific
and educational communities to task for effectively monopolizing
public education with their epistemological and ontological value
systems while simultaneously seeking to exclude religious value
systems which, they claim, are being "imposed" on the public school
curricula.2 4 Finally, Carter repeatedly and severely criticizes the
Supreme Court for embracing an impoverished understanding of
religion-as an entirely private and freely chosen matter-and for
ignoring the unique institutional role that religion can fulfill in
contemporary society.21 In turn, he contends that these institutional attitudes collectively foster a cultural ethos that prevents religion
from being taken seriously as a legitimate source of truth and

creationism); pp.2 4231, 234 (discussing abortion).
20 See, e.g., p.
9 ("I must confess a bias .... I share the traditional Christian view
that suicide is wrong.").
" See William F. Buckley, Jr., Right to Sin Cramping Right to Religion, HOUS.
CHRON., Sept. 20, 1993, at A14 (book review).
See infra text accompanying notes 55, 84-87.
See, e.g., pp. 24-26.
24 See, e.g., pp. 157-62.
' See, e.g., pp. 126-32, 141-42, 269.
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meaning, and that treats religion as an irrational matter of private
concern, ultimately unfit for the public square. "In contemporary
American culture," he alleges, "the religions are more and more
treated as just passing beliefs-almost as fads, older, stuffier, less
liberal versions of so-called New Age-rather than as the fundaments
26
upon which the devout build their lives."
If Carter is correct, however, in his assessment of the declining
perception of religion and the waning role of religion in public life,
then what does he make of the ubiquitousness of religious references and figures in our politics, such as at the party conventions
preceding the 1992 presidential election?27 The problem with
these references, insists Carter, is that far from evincing a meaningful place for religion in the public square, they in fact suggest the
exact opposite. Precisely because they are so ubiquitous, the quality
of such references is highly superficial and "can itself be a form of
trivialization-both because our politicians are expected to repeat
largely meaningless religious incantations and because of the
modern tendency among committed advocates across the political
spectrum to treat Holy Scripture like a dictionary of familiar quotations." 2 It is, in other words, largely a matter of perspective:
when viewed in a different light or from a different vantage point,
such references can be interpreted to support rather than under14.
The ubiquitousness observation has been perhaps the most common rebuttal
to Carter's theory. See e.g., Michiko Kakutani, RewritingReligion s Rolefor the Political
Arena, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1993, at C18 (stating that "the fact that the two most
recent Democratic presidents-Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton-are liberals and avowed
Christians who regularly attend church" undermines Carter's assertion that "the
liberal establishment treats religion as a hobby"); Michael Kinsley, Martyr Complex,
NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 13, 1993, at 4 (book review) (stating that "believers" dominate
"the public discourse," leaving him "honestly bewildered by the frequent complaint
that American culture is hostile to religion").
28 P. 45. Needless to say, Carter is not opposed in principle to the express use of
religion in politics, and he considers it entirely acceptable for one's politics to be
driven by-to be a product of-one's religious beliefs. What he finds problematic is
the superficial and self-serving appropriation of religion by politics-the secondary use
of religion for explicitly political ends. "[T]here is a vital difference between a
political inspiration that is fired by one's deepest religious beliefs and a claim of
religious belief that is fired by a preexisting political commitment.... In this [latter]
sense-as the servant of politics-religion is very much in the public square." P. 80.
Personally, I am not sure that Carter's dichotomy is fully defensible insofar as the
dynamics of the relationship between religious meaning and political culture are
extremely difficult to discern. This is particularly true in the context of religions,
such as various Christian denominations, which either developed amidst a specific
configuration of historical and cultural circumstances or presently understand
themselves as being in an ongoing relationship with history and culture.
26 p.
2'
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mine the notion that a culture of disbelief truly exists. In fact, it
may be entirely proper to say that both Carter and his critics are in
some sense correct and that the references of which they speak may,
depending on one's interpretative perspective, be at once trivializing
to some observers yet not to others.
Yet it is this very realization-that the meaning of the evidence
may largely be in the eye of the beholder-that presents the most
serious challenge to Carter's basic contention that a culture of
disbelief actually exists. Indeed, while page upon page of this Essay
could be devoted to a point-counterpoint analysis of Carter's
empirical proof, it is highly unlikely that such an analysis would
yield a satisfactory answer. For the inquiry is not merely a straightforward empirical matter (as Carter would apparently have his
reader presume), but rather one that presupposes a variety of
conceptual and interpretive premises. In turn, the evidence selected
and the manner in which that evidence is arranged and assessedeach a product of prior expectations and biases-will inherently tend
to favor one conclusion over another.2 9 To see this, we might
simply consider the innumerable ways the proof could be structured. Should one focus on the quality of religious references in
politics (as Carter contends) or on their quantity (as his critics
contend)? Should one focus on the place that religions do have in
public life or the role which they do not? Should one focus on the
subjective experiences of religious citizens or upon the objective
reality of their involvement in law and politics? Should one focus

' Carter's perspective, for example, is no doubt influenced by his position as a law
professor. Thus he might place greater stock in Supreme Court decisions than, say,
a doctor or carpenter. Likewise, his academic affiliation probably oversensitizes him
to the phenomena of trivialization and privatization. The modern university, after all,
is not typically known for its emphasis on traditional religion. See Frederick M.
Cedicks, Public Life and Hostility to Religion, 78 VA. L. REV. 671, 671 n.2 (1992)
(noting that commentators have observed hostility on the part of the "legal academy"
towards religion); Peter Steinfels, UniversitiesBiased Against Religion, ScholarSays, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 26,1993, at A22 (discussing perceived academic bias against "scholarship
that reflects religious viewpoints, especially traditional Christian ones"). The legal
academy, in particular, with its almost singular devotion to logical positivist reasoning,
can certainly cause one to experience second thoughts about the public validity of
one's religious faith. See generally Roger C. Cramton, The OrdinaryReligion of the Law
School Classroom,29J. LEGAL EDUC. 247 (1978) (exposing the dominant normative and
analytical mode in legal education and examining its relationship to competing
sources of meaning and value such as religion).
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on the political and legal treatment of all religions or of only certain
types of religions?" In what ways should the historical or traditional role of religion be relevant to contemporary political society?
And to what extent is it valid to rely on anecdotes, litigation, and
other sources of evidence that are likely to contain a strong element
of nonrandomness? However one chooses to answer these questions, they plainly expose the difficulty of the inquiry and the need
to remain wary when entering the realm of cultural perception. For
just as Carter's book is concerned with cultural attitudes and the
impact of law and politics on those attitudes, so too must a critique
of his book remain cognizant of the ways in which Carter himself
creates or encourages certain cultural constructions.
This is not to say, of course, that Carter has not accurately
described various events or that one can draw no conclusions
whatsoever from their sum total."1 (To the extent that this critique
cuts both ways, in fact, it would be equally problematic for Carter's
critics to dismiss his claims out of hand.) But the contention that
one can prove or disprove a "culture of disbelief" seems extraordinarily problematic in light of the complex nature of our political
and legal institutions, the overwhelming array of forces and
circumstances that give shape to our public discourse, and the
significant degree of subjectivity inherent in such an undertaking.

"0Consider more closely the employment applicant example cited earlier. See
supra note 18 and accompanying text. Recall that the applicant was advised not to
disclose his affiliation with a nonmainstream religious organization, lest "a potential
employer might think him a religious fanatic." If true, this tale clearly illustrates that
religious discrimination is perceived to be alive and well in contemporary society. But
it hardly illustrates that our culture has undergone some type of conceptual
transformation. To the contrary, discrimination against nonmainstream religions has
a long and disturbing pedigree, in our culture no less than in many other cultures,
and thus we should be hesitant to discern anything new from its continued presence.
See, e.g., RELIGION AND PoLmcs 23-46 (Peter H. Odegard ed., 1960) (focusing on antiCatholic sentiment in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries); Edwin B.
Firmage, Free Exercise of Religion in Nineteenth Century America: The Mormon Cases, 7
J.L. & RELIGION 281 (1989) (detailing the legal and social persecution of Mormons);
John Rhodes, An American Tradition: The Religious Persecutionof Native Americans, 52
MONT. L. REV. 13, 15 (1991) (describing "[t]he legal system's role in the present
denial of the religious freedom of Native Americans").
"' See infra part I.A.3 (dividing the empirical inquiry into six elemental theses,
thereby allowing readers to examine more systematically the role of religion in our
political culture and possibly to draw certain limited conclusions).
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2. Origins of the Culture of Disbelief
Assuming, however, that Carter may be correct in some
objective sense and that the evidence fairly points to a culture of
disbelief, we must then ask our second question: When and why did
the culture of disbelief originate and what are its perpetuating
forces? Carter's somewhat provocative answer is that the culture is
directly traceable to Roe v. Wade,12 the 1973 Supreme Court
decision that constitutionalized a right to abortion and that has
influenced so much of our legal and political order. Prior to Roe,
he argues, "the public rhetoric of religion [from abolitionism to civil
rights] had largely been the property of liberalism."3" The unanticipated radicalism of Roe, however, quite suddenly converted the
nascent pro-life movement into a national phenomenon and moved
religious conservatives, many of whom previously had preached
political abstinence, into the role of religious political activists. 4
And according to Carter, then, it is precisely this abortion-related
displacement of liberals as bearers of the religious torch in national
politics that has created our present-day legal and political culture
of disbelief-in which liberals are extremely uneasy about the
presence of religion in politics (unless they turn a blind eye to the
religion factor), 5 and religious citizens of all stripes feel alienated
from the public square.
This explanation is appealing, and the consitutionalization of
abortion no doubt has a great deal to do with the shape and
substance of contemporary politics. But as Carter must know, this
explanation is also too simplistic, for Roe was handed down in a
cultural context that was, and continues to be, the product of a
centuries-long philosophical transformation that has drastically
altered the place of religion in society generally. Such a transformation might plausibly include the gradual displacement of religion by
government as a major influence in the nation's social life; 36 the
shift from relative homogeneity or hegemony to genuine religious
2410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3P. 58.
34 See id.

" See pp. 59-60 (discussing politicians' treatment of religion and the resulting
media response); see also infra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
See PAUL G. KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 10-11 (1964). See

generally HaroldJ. Berman, Religious Freedom and the Challenge of the Modern State, in
ARTICLES OF FAITH, ARTICLES OF PEACE 40 (James D. Hunter & Os Guinness eds.,

1990) [hereinafter ARTICLES OF FAITH] (discussing the displacement of religion by the
state in certain social functions).
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pluralism;"7 the advent of certain political, social, or jurisprudential
paradigms (such as positivism, utilitarianism, or liberal individualism);"8 the rise of modem science and a related emphasis on
skeptical, empirical approaches to the world;3 9 and theological
changes from within religions themselves."
To be sure, it is
possible to find commentators well before the Roe decision making
observations, and using language, strikingly similar to Carter's:
[There are those who argue that r]eligion is to be driven out of
public institutions, public functions, and public life in so far as
possible. A modem measure of purely private piety may be
useful-particularly in other people, but there is no need for the
enlightened man of the twentieth century to take religion seriously
as an intellectual discipline in his university or a shaping force in
his social existence.41
Therefore, while Roe may have been a triggering event, it is difficult
to say that it actually "caused" the culture of disbelief any more
37 See SYDNEY E. AHLsTROM, A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 749

(1972) (arguing that immigration during the nineteenth century awakened American
spiritual self-consciousness); KAUPER, supra note 36, at 6-10 (discussing the
significance of religious pluralism); James D. Hunter, Religious Freedom and the
Challenge of Modem Pluralism, in ARTICLES OF FAITH, supra note 36, at 54, 55-58
(discussing religious pluralism in the eighteenth and late nineteenth centuries).
IsSee generallyJohn V. Orth, Castingthe Priests Out of the Temple: John Austin and
the Relation Between Law and Religion, in THE WEIGHTIER MATTERS OF THE LAW:
ESSAYS ON LAW AND RELIGION 229 (John Witte,Jr. & Frank S. Alexander eds., 1988)
(discussing the nineteenth century Church of England's response to contemporary
political developments); RobertJ. Lipkin, Beyond Skepticism, Foundationalismand the
New Fuzziness: The Role of Wide Reflective Equilibrium in Legal Theory, 75 CORNELL L.
REV. 811, 816 n.16 (1990) (noting that modernist modes of thought, such as
rationalism, liberalism, and positivism, can be traced to the processes of secularization
and rationalization (citing DOUGLAS KELLNER, CRITICAL THEORY, MARXISM, AND

MODERNITY 3-4 (1989))); C. Ann Potter, Will the "Rightto Die"Become a License to Kill?:
The Growth of Euthanasiain America, 19 J. LEGIS. 31, 55-60 (1993) (examining the
relationship between the post-Enlightenment decline of religious natural law
jurisprudence and the rise of positivistic utilitarianism and secularism).
39See PETER L. BERGER, A FAR GLORY:

THE QUEST FOR FAITH IN AN AGE OF

CREDULITY 26-27, 124-26 (1992) (discussing the impact of science, technology, and
modernity on religious beliefs); EDWIN S. GAUSTAD, A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF

AMERICA 267-70 (new rev. ed. 1990) (discussing the ideological clashes between
modernists and fundamentalists and how their debate determines control of public
institutions).
40 See AHLSTROM, supra note 37, at 1079-96; GAUSTAD, supra note 39, at 270-83.
See generally ROBERT WUTHNOW, THE RESTRUCTURING OF AMERICAN RELIGION (1988)

(suggesting that rationality, natural science, and the social sciences have exercised a
negative effect on traditional religious beliefs and practices).
41 Franklin H. Littell, The Basis of Religious Liberty in ChristianBelief, 6J. CHURCH
& ST. 132, 134 (1964).
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than, say, the assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand actually
caused World War I or the first Rodney King verdicts caused the
Los Angeles riots of 1992.
3. Reordering the Search for the Culture of Disbelief
That Carter's empirical claims thus far should be so vulnerable
to criticism reveals that the principal shortcoming of Carter's thesis
is not a lack of imagination, or even a lack of evidence, but rather
his failure to provide a clear and systematic methodology. Readers
may reasonably and sharply disagree with Carter and with one
another precisely because the "culture of disbelief," as an empirical
concept, is not carefully defined and, hence, is largely in the eye of
the beholder. I recognize, of course, that Carter is not a social
scientist, and he certainly makes no formal pretense to that effect.
Nevertheless, insofar as he has undertaken a complex empirical
inquiry and has drawn definite conclusions, there is an obligation
on his part to explain more fully the propriety of his chosen
evidence, to classify systematically the phenomena he claims to have
observed, and to address the underlying biases and expectations
that can significantly color both one's analysis and one's conclusions.
In an attempt to move Carter's inquiry in this direction, this
final portion of Section A is devoted to cataloging the various
conceptual paradigms we might invoke to describe and understand
Carter's culture of disbelief. Specifically, I have in mind six
interrelated theses proposed by various scholars (including Carter),
which are in turn raised by Carter in his book, that either describe
a phenomenon or state a perspective relating to the relationship
between religion and our political culture. These are: (1) the
trivialization thesis,4" (2) the double-standard thesis,4" (3) the
privatization thesis," (4) the false neutrality thesis,4" (5) the
hostility thesis, 46 and (6) the secularization thesis.47 As one might
imagine, each varies in terms of its acceptance among relevant
observers. Carter, for example, strongly embraces the first four
while he is ambivalent or unclear as to the last two.
42 See infra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.

4 See infra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
"See infra notes 56-63 and accompanying text.
45 See infra notes 64-67, 71 and accompanying text.
46
See infra note 68-70 and accompanying text.
41

See

infra note 71-72 and accompanying text.
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Indeed, my hope in setting out each thesis is not to achieve
universal acceptance, but simply to offer a more refined way of
examining the phenomena that lead Carter, for one, to conclude
that a full-fledged culture of disbelief exists. Rather than abandon
his inquiry altogether, I believe that by breaking it down into its
constitutive parts-in this case into six theses-we can more clearly
discern the conceptual components of his proof and perhaps even
the points that we, as participants in the inquiry, find ourselves in
disagreement. What follows, therefore, is less a critical reanalysis
of the evidence and more a preliminary attempt to reorder the
inquiry.
The first and most obvious thesis is that of trivialization-the
notion that contemporary law and politics trivialize, in purpose or
effect, religion in general and serious religious devotion in particular. Needless to say, Carter wholeheartedly embraces this thesis,
and indeed it serves as his central paradigm to describe the essence
and effects of the culture of disbelief.4 8 According to this paradigm, religious beliefs and practices are increasingly perceived as
simply another type of preference, freely chosen and thus freely
able to be ignored. Such a perception, he suggests, is the reductio
of a "widely shared intuition" about what religion is and should
be." It is an intuition-apparently shared by some members of the
Supreme CourtS°--that tells religious citizens, when faced with
conflicts between the demands of the state and the demands of their
faith, that they should simply do nothing.
[T]he message seems to be that they should, if necessary, change
their religion; but if they protest on religious grounds, they are
somehow acting in an illiberal manner.
The intuition says, in short, that religion is like building model
airplanes,just another hobby: something quiet, something private,
something trivial-and not really a fit activity for intelligent, publicspirited adults.5 1
Second is what we might call the "double standard thesis," a
concept related to trivialization and equally embraced by Carter.
48

See pp. 3-11 (discussing the increasing unimportance of religion in the political
and legal culture of the United States).
'9 Pp. 20-22.
' See, e.g., Wallace v.Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52-53 (1985) (suggesting that religious
faith is freely and individually chosen and maintained); Estate of Thorton v. Caldor,

Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 711 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (same).
" Pp. 21-22.
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The general idea is that religious political participation is considered acceptable or unacceptable by the media and others depending
upon the ideological agenda of the participants (for example, liberal
versus conservative), where religiousness is used as a means to
stigmatize only certain kinds of views.52 "[I]n the 1992 campaign,"
observes Carter, "the media often treated President Bush's speeches
to religious organizations as pandering-but when Bill Clinton
spoke, for example, to a black Baptist group, he was given credit for
shrewdness."5 3 Or consider the generally positive treatment given
to religious involvement in the civil rights or antiwar movements of
the 1960s, the election of Jimmy Carter in 1976, or the antinuclear
movement of the 1980s with the generally negative treatment given
to religious involvement in the antiabortion or antigay rights
movements of the 1980s and 1990s.54 As Carter further points out,
this ideological manipulation of religion by political observers is
fundamentally misguided, for "if one dislikes the causes in which
the name of God is invoked, it is those causes, not the God-talk
itself that should [be] ... the object of criticism. " "
Third is the privatization thesis, which holds that religion is a
private matter, relegated to the sphere of the individual, and that
the injection of religious values or views into the public square may
be impolite if not unacceptable.56 Empirically, the phenomenon
52 See Idleman, Religious Values, supra note 7, at 451-53.

" P. 59. Likewise, there are surprisingly few critics of either President Clinton's
or Vice President Gore's explicit linkages between religious faith and public policy.
Regarding Clinton's religiosity, see Bob Keeler, Faith in the White House, NEWSDAY,
Sept. 13, 1993, at 48; Kenneth T. Walsh, Clinton'sJourney Inward, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Dec. 13, 1993, at 40 (discussing Clinton's religious odyssey since
becoming President); Larry Witham, Clinton's Religious View of His Job: The Bully
Pulpitfor a "Ministsy," WASH. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1993, at Al (discussing President
Clinton's endorsement of religion's position in public life and the role of religion in
securing "the common good"). Regarding Gore's religiosity, see generally AL GORE,
EARTH IN THE BALANCE: ECOLOGY AND THE HUMAN SPIRIT (1992) (describing Vice
President Gore's religious faith in the context of an examination of science and the
environment).
' See generally pp. 45-49, 58-65.
55 P. 49.
6 See STEPHEN V. MONSMA, POSITIVE NEUTRALITY: LETTING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
RING 59-68 (1993) (discussing religion as a private activity); Gerard V. Bradley,
Dogmatomachy-A "Privatization"Theosy of the Religion Clause Cases, 30 ST. LOUIs U. L.J.
275, 277 (1986) (arguing that recent cases represent an attempt to move religion into
the realm of subjective preference by eliminating religious consciousness); Susan
Trausch, Politicsand Faith, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 3, 1993, at 15 (noting an ethos of
privatization within various professions).
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of privatization is not nearly as disputed as the hostility thesis,57
largely because it is relatively easy to find institutional expressions
of privatization, such as those by the media 58 or the Supreme
Court.5 9 Normatively, however, its merits are far from uncontroversial. For example, while Carter accepts a vision of religion as
private in the sense of being beyond the competence of the state
(the public), he categorically rejects the view that religious citizens
should not be allowed to be publicly religious or to participate
politically or legally unless their religiosity is suppressed. Such a
view, he argues, is both unrealistic and unfair; unrealistic because
religious values are an integral part of one's personality and cannot
be simply "shrugged off" like one's favorite color,6" and unfair
because it effectively asks the religious citizen to "split off a part of
her self."6 1 Additionally, excessive privatization undermines the
contributive potential of religion in our law and politics, a potential
that is central to Carter's own theory of religion and government as
set forth below in Section B. "In holding, as we must, that religion
is part of the purely private arena that the state must never disrupt,
we run the risk of disabling the religiously devout from working
seriously in the realm of policy."6" Finally, Carter contends that
such a view receives little or no support from the American public,
at least in terms of the "sharp distinction between religion as a
public force and a private one that the guardians of the public
63
square suppose."
57

See infra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
Commenting on Carter's references to his own religiosity in the book, one
reviewer said, "What is unusual, indeed almost startling, is finding them in a book by
a distinguished professor making serious arguments about constitutional theory and
political philosophy." Peter Steinfels, Beliefs, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1993, § 1, at 8
(book review). Startling indeed, but only insofar as Carter is correct that religious
references are implicitly understood as off limits within circles of (enlightened) public
discourse.
9
See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2656 (1992) (holding that public school's
activities in connection with the offering of prayer at graduation constituted
government involvement prohibited by the Establishment Clause); Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971) (holding that statute allowing state to pay salary
supplement to teachers in nonpublic schools involved excessive entanglement of

government and religion); Richard S. Myers, The Supreme Court and the Privatization
of Religion, 41 CATH. U. L. REV. 19, 21 (1991) (examining the privatization thesis
through discussion of the Establishment Clause and substantive due process).
60
P. 56.
61
Id. (citing MICHAELJ. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICs, AND LAW: A BICENTENNIAL
ESSAY 72-73 (1988)).
62P. 21.
6

3 p. 119.
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Fourth is what I shall call the "false neutrality thesis." This
thesis is really a collection of three commonly overlooked errors
pertaining to the concept of governmental neutrality. First, it is
often suggested that positive law, including judicial constitutional
doctrine, is "neutral" toward and among religions-that the state
does not judge the truth or falsity of religious beliefs, or that our
laws, as long as they do not single out religion specifically, are thus
impartial towards religion. As Carter points out, however, such laws
can effectively treat religious beliefs as false and can only be
considered "neutral," if at all, "from the point of view of the
state."6 4 Second, it is sometimes suggested that, and certainly the
courts act as if, the legal conception or definition of religion-for
example, as a private, voluntary matter-is likewise neutral toward
religious claimants or among religious traditions. Again, however,
this kind of Jeffersonian understanding of religion excludes entire
categories of religious faith and experience, and thus effectively
discriminates against those religious beliefs and practices that
deviate from it.65 Finally, it is often said that governmental
neutrality leaves religion unaffected-that neutral motives or words
create neutral effects-and perhaps even that it benefits religion.6 6

P. 221 (emphasis omitted); see also Edward B. Foley, PoliticalLiberalism and
Establishment ClauseJurisprudence, 43 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 963, 972-78 (1993)
(asserting that even if the Supreme Court adheres to the "endorsement" test
articulated by Justice O'Connor in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-94 (1984)
(O'Connor,J., concurring), the "Court cannot guarantee completely equal treatment
for all religious belief-systems that exist, or conceivably might exist, in our society");
Note, Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion: A Subjective Alternative, 102 HARv. L.
REV. 1258, 1270 (1989) ("The seeming neutrality of objective tests allows courts to
maintain the veneer of jealously guarding religious rights while actually denying
protection to those who need it most.").
' See pp. 116-17, 297 n.31 (asserting thatJefferson's vision of the relationship
between government and religion "was strongly shaped by his vision of religion itself,
which he considered a matter of individual conscience rather than of corporate
worship"); Edwin S. Gaustad, Church and State Re-Examined: A Baptist View, 4 J.
CHURCH & ST. 76, 80 (1962) (Jefferson's view that religion is entirely a private matter
"is untrue for the reason that th[e] vertical relationship [between each person and
God] does not comprise the whole of religion. For there is a multitude of horizontal
relationships in which this intimate experience must necessarily express itself.");
Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of FreeExercise, 1990 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 23-30 (arguing
that implicit in the Court's interpretation of the First Amendment is invariably a
conception of religion, which is limited and overgeneralized); David C. Williams &
Susan H. Williams, Volitionalism and Religious Liberty, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 771
(1991) (noting that "discrimination against nonvolitionalism seems to violate our
commitment to neutrality toward all religions").
' One expression of this type of neutrality can be found in William L. Miller, The
Principleof Religious Liberty, 6 J. CHURCH & ST. 85 (1964), which argues:
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Of course, to the extent that religion is not purposefully discriminated against under a regime of neutrality, this is largely true.
However, as Carter's book and this Essay attempt to show, governmental doctrines and principles that appear to be neutral may
nevertheless have palpable adverse effects on the public and legal
understanding of religion, on the form and even the substance of
religion, and on the way religious adherents perceive their faith and
their relationship to the state.67
The fifth thesis, more controversial than trivialization but of
similar genealogy, is that of hostility. Our politics and law,
according to this thesis, do not simply trivialize religious devotion;
they are downright hostile to it.68 In turn, the apparent difference
between trivialization and hostility is a function of the underlying
purpose or motive and perhaps of degree: trivialization becomes
hostility when it is either intentional or excessive. While Carter
unquestionably endorses the trivialization thesis, he seems unwilling
(perhaps not to alienate readers) to provide the same kind of
endorsement to hostility. Where he ends up, in fact, is directly in
the middle of the debate, observing that "it is not difficult to
understand why religious people seeking entrance to the public
square" 69 might sense hostility, but suggesting that he himself is
unsure as to whether such hostility actually exists. 0
The state is impartial with respect to ultimate beliefs not because it is
entirely ignorant about and unimpressed with these, pursuing its secular
goals without any reference to the religious or irreligious opinion of the
people-but rather because it defers to the conscience of the people that it
rules.... Our state leaves religious matters aside, not because they are
beneath or against its concern, but because they are above its concern.
Id. at 85 (emphasis omitted).
See infra part I.E.
68 See e.g., MONSMA, supranote 56, at 68-73 (noting hostility against particularistic
religions whose adherents take their faith as an authoritative, literal force in their
lives, the clearest evidence suggesting that "at least a degree of bias against religion
is found in the widespread assumption that religious differences and disputes are
particularly divisive, leading to intolerance and a bitterness that is normally absent
from U.S. society"); Edward M. Gaffney, Jr., Hostility to Religion, American Style, 42
DEPAUL L. REV. 263, 270 (1992) (asserting that "Americans have been hostile to two
religious communities-Muslims and Roman Catholics-throughout our history, and
that we continue to reap the ill effects of this hostility"); Gedicks, supra note 29, at
671-72 nn.1-5 (citing various commentators', including Carter's, observations
regarding American hostility to religion evidenced in the legal academy, Supreme
Court decisions, and public life).
'7

69 p. 52.

71 See pp. 51-56 (asserting that it is not "quite right" to say that the public square
has become hostile to religion, but that it is correct to note that "the rules of our
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The sixth and final thesis is that of secularization. This thesis
can be expressed either empirically to explain other phenomena (for
example, the increasing secularization of politics may explain
religion's trivialization) or normatively (for example, the position
that all facets of law and politics should be procedurally and
substantively secular), the latter of which is commonly referred to
as secularism. The normative thesis, in turn, can either be "neutral"
toward religion, paying no attention to the effects of secularized
government on religion, 71 or be antireligious, or specifically aimed
at the extermination of religion from public life (which of course
would be one form of hostility). 2 Carter himself appears to
observe both the empirical and the normative versions of secularization, including the antireligious secularists, although once again he
is ultimately ambivalent regarding the presence or absence of actual
hostility.
These, then, are the six principal theses invoked by Carter and
others to describe or explain the current treatment of religion in
public life. In relation to Carter's book, their value is basically twofold. First, although not exhaustive, they plainly reveal the range of
phenomena that underlie Carter's conclusion that a culture of
disbelief exists, and may in turn shed additional light on the
accuracy of that conclusion. Thus, for example, while I personally
find it difficult to derive inductively from them a full-fledged "legal
and political culture of disbelief," as Carter obviously does, I find all
six theses to some degree compelling and consequently have no
doubt that Carter, like each of the authors from whom he draws,
has unearthed a pattern of significant if not disturbing phenomena
concerning our contemporary situation. Second, these six propositions further remind us just how complex Carter's undertaking
actually is, especially since they mostly concern only the empirical
dimension of that undertaking; the entire dimension of conceptual
biases and prior expectations-no doubt the source of our ability to
reach differing conclusions from essentially the same evidence-has
remained largely unaddressed.
And until that dimension is
addressed, it must fall upon each individual reader, as both a

public square exist on uneasy terms with religion").
"' Throughout the book, Carter repeatedly cites Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and
Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 195 (1992), as the exemplar of this version of

secularism.
' See Idleman, Ideology as Interpretation,supranote 7 (addressing scholarship that
is not only largely secularist, but also appears to verge on antireligious in its presumptions and prescriptions).
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member and yet a critic of culture, to discern the validity of Carter's
analysis and the meaning of the evidence for the role of religion in
our law and politics. That being said, let us now turn to the major
normative dimension of Carter's book, namely his basic model of
religion and government.

B. Carter's General Theory of Religion and Government
All in all, the most provocative and useful part of Carter's book
may not be his empirical claim that we have a culture of disbelief,
but rather his normative conception of the proper relationship
between government and religion.7" That conception, sketched
out briefly in the introductory Section above, is premised on the
idea that religious involvement in politics and law can be indispensably beneficial for the state,74 even if-and perhaps especially if-the
former is in vigorous dissent from the latter. This particular theory
is not new, of course, and Carter himself draws from the observations of Alexis de Tocqueville:
Translating Tocqueville's observations to the present day (and
removing his pro-Christian bias), one.., sees two chief functions
that religions can serve in a democracy. First, they can serve as
the sources of moral understanding without which any majoritarian system can deteriorate into simple tyranny, and, second,
they can mediate between the citizen and the apparatus of
government, providing an independent moral voice. Indeed, from
Tocqueville's day to contemporary theories of pluralism, the need
for independent mediating institutions has been a staple of
political science.
... Like other intermediate institutions, religions that command the devotion of their members actually promote freedom
and reduce the likelihood of democratic tyranny by splitting the
allegiance of citizens and pressing on their members points of view

" Carter defines "religion" in fairly traditional terms: "Although many thoughtful
sociologists and historians have defined religion in other ways, the belief in
supernatural intervention in human affairs is a useful divider for our present
purposes, because that is where the culture seems to draw the line between that which
is suspect and that which is not." P. 25.
4

See, e.g., PETER L. BERGER & RICHARDJ. NEUHAUS, To EMPOWER PEOPLE: THE
ROLE OF MEDIATING STRUCTURES IN PUBLIC PoLIcY 26-33 (1977) (challenging the
proposition, historically derived from the social thought of the Enlightenment, that
"even if religion continues to flourish, it deals purely with the private sphere of life
and is therefore irrelevant to public policy" by contending that "mediating
institutions, including religious institutions, be utilized as much as possible as the
implementing agencies of [public] policy goals").
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that are often radically different from the preferences of the
75
state.
Based on this understanding, Carter insists that the religious
presence in politics and society should generally be welcomed, not
feared. This, to be sure, is one of the great ironies in contemporary
perceptions of religion:
The very aspect of religions that many of their critics most fearthat the religiously devout, in the name of their faith, take
positions that differ from approved state policy-is one of their
strengths.... Taking an independent path-exercising what
[theologian David] Tracy calls the power of resistance-is part of
76
what religions are for.
Of course, this kind of perspective on the political value of religion
is not universally held, either as a normative goal or as an empirical
norm, but rather derives from Carter's particular view of religiosity.
According to Carter,
[a] religion... is not simply a means for understanding one's self,
or even of contemplating the nature of the universe, or existence,
or of anything else. A religion is, at its heart, a way of denying the
authority of the rest of the world; it is a way of saying to fellow
human beings and to the state those fellow human beings have
77
erected, "No, I will not accede to your will."
In the context of his theory of religion and government, the
paradigmatic illustration of religion as a mediating source of
resistance would thus be the religious citizen who, when confronted
with a governmental action antithetical to her faith, must profess to
the state Luther's "ich kan nicht anderst, hie stehe ich. " ("I cannot do
otherwise, here I stand.") 78 We should not assume, however, that
this dissentient function of religion-this "power of resistance"-is
limited to the sphere of the individual or that, as its name implies,
it is concerned only with resistance and not with the transformation
of the political and social order. To the contrary, contends Carter,
71pp. 36-37.
76

P. 37 (citing DAVID TRAcY, PLURALITY AND AMBIGUITY:

HERMENEUTICS,

RELIGION, HOPE 83 (1987)); see also pp. 9, 80-82 (stating that there is "nothing wrong

and much right with letting religious faith be the wellspring of a citizen's public
action").
7 P. 41.
7" Harold J. Berman & John Witte, Jr., The Transformation of Western Legal
Philosophy in Lutheran Germany, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1575, 1647 n.209 (1989) (citing

and translating 7 D. MARTIN LUTHERS WERKE, KRITISCHE GESAMTAUSGABE 838 (1974)

(1883)).
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we must properly attribute to it the moral determination of such
transformative figures as Martin Luther King, Jr.,79 and Joseph
Rummel, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of New Orleans who, in
1956, threatened Roman Catholic legislators with excommunication
80
if they supported de jure segregation of private schools.
The central point of Carter's theory, then, is that a vigorous
religious presence is a necessary part of a vigorous democratic
order, and that we all stand to lose when religion is excluded from
the public square-even if such exclusion seems expedient in the
short run. In turn, it is precisely because of this institutional or
structural relationship that the culture of disbelief, as a paradigm of
religion in politics, is so inherently problematic. For just as the
excessive entanglement of government and religion "tends to
destroy government and to degrade religion,"" the excessive
detachment of religion from government-in this case through the
related phenomena of trivialization, privatization, and secularization-may either emasculate religion and thus unduly empower
government, or alienate religion and thus threaten government.
In the abstract, of course, Carter's theory seems largely
unobjectionable. As Harold Berman correctly observes, "[w]here
[law and religion] are divorced from each other, law tends to
degenerate into legalism and religion into religiosity." 2 The
abstract, however, is rarely the forum either of heated public
controversy or of practical political solutions, and in the end we are
still left to confront a host of concrete and difficult controversies.
How should we deal, for example, with the overzealous religious
movement that purposefully seeks either to use the state as a
conduit for its entire agenda (thus offending a liberal conception of
the state) or effectively to become the state (thus undermining
Carter's vision, let alone certain First Amendment values)? After all,
" See p. 38 (asserting that King, in his famous letter from the Birmingham City
Jail, "was stating a bedrock commitment to the authority of God as superiorto the
authority of the state").
' See pp. 63-64 (noting that because segregationist Catholic legislators blasted
Rummel for what they considered a violation of the separation of church and state,
the "rhetoric of the 1950's was just like the rhetoric of the 1990's, except that in
1956, the liberals cheered and the conservatives got mad").
81Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962) (stating that "government... should
stay out of the business of writing or sanctioning official prayers").
2 HAROLDJ. BERMAN, THE INTERACTION OF LAW AND RELIGION 25 (1974) (stating
that "law and religion are two different but interrelated aspects, two dimensions of
social experience ... [and d]espite the tensions between them, one cannot flourish
without the other").
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a simple exposition on the virtues of separation and robust
democracy would likely do little to dissuade such a movement from
pursuing its goals, particularly when each side defines a healthy
constitutional order in starkly different terms. Aware of this
possibility, especially given the recent rise of the Christian Coalition,13 Carter argues that the proper response is not to single out
religion for exclusion from the political process, but to confront
such attempts within that process. "The error, as a matter of
secular politics, is to suppose that it is the Christian Coalition's
religiosity rather than its platform that is the enemy."84 If it is the
religious right's conservatism that is problematic, he contends,
rather than use religion as an overbroad proxy for conservatism and
banish it judicially by calling it an establishment, the conservatism
should be confronted directly in the polls and on the legislative
floor. It is these fora (the "political market"), and not the courts, he
8 5
says, that "will always be our best check on potential oppressors."
And those "[o]pponents of the new Christian right who see this as
too much work-Why can't we just litigate? Won't a press conference do
just as much?-simply are less serious than the Christian Coalition
itself about winning. " " Such an approach, he suggests, would be
fairer both to religion or religious citizens, many of whom harbor
no such agendas and often have a great deal to contribute, and to
our basic commitment to participatory politics, a commitment that
is potentially undermined when citizens attempt to defeat or
87
exclude one another through nonpolitical channels.

' See e.g., pp. 264-68 (describing the attempts of the Christian Coalition to
influence local elections). The Christian Coalition is a theologically and morally
conservative organization, formed by the Reverend Pat Robertson, that seeks to
acquire national political influence primarily at the grass-roots level-school boards,
city councils, hospital boards, and the like. See Joe Conason, The Religious Right's
Quiet Revival: Pat Robertson's Christian Coalition,254 NATION 541, 541 (1992).
84 P. 266.
' P. 267. Likewise, Carter argues that if creationism should be barred from
school curricula, the reason should not be its religious association, but simply because
it constitutes "bad science." Pp. 161-62.
86 P. 268.
s' See pp. 267-68 (arguing that "the defeat of the Christian right" must take place,
if it is to take place at all, in the political arena). Similarly, Carter argues that liberal
democratic theory's emphasis on accessible dialogue is misplaced, and that liberalism
should embrace "whatever form of dialogue a member of the public offers." P. 230.
This is a position that I basically share. See Idleman, Religious Values, supra note 7,
at 443-48 (arguing that "[i]f taken to its logical end.., the accessibility requirement
would purge from the law-making process not only certain religious knowledge but
also most moral discourse ... consequently reduc[ing] the process to a sterile
dialogue about a small body of data on which all citizens can agree").

1994]

VALUING RELIGION

1337

By and large, Carter appears to provide a viable theoretical
framework to explain and justify the relationship between government and religion, or at least some aspects of that relationship.
Carter is certainly correct that religions may serve society through
their ethical and prophetic functions s8 and even through their
confrontations with the state.89 As a practical matter, moreover,
his model works because it would apparently encompass any
religion that chooses to participate in the political and legal
processes, for when a religion engages in such participation, it
would presumably be fulfilling one of its functions as a mediating
institution by serving to counterbalance the excesses and errors of
the state. At the same time, any religion choosing to forego the
benefits and burdens of political participation could do so and
would not be obviously penalized for its choice.
In short, if
society is to benefit from the unique contributions that religions can
make, then at least as a nonconstitutional matter," religions
indeed ought to have full and equal access to the political and legal
realms.
This is not to say, however, that Carter's theory is entirely
sensible. One very practical problem, in fact, is that of marketing
" See, e.g., KAUPER, supra note 36, at 84 (arguing that "the cultivation of moral
insights and values is ... a function of religious faith .... and it is the business of
the churches to speak with a prophetic voice in addressing themselves to the
conditions of our day"); George W. Forell, ChristianFreedom and Religious Liberty, in
RELIGIOuS LIBERTY 1, 19-20 (Cedric W. Tilberg ed., 1968) (arguing that Christian
citizens and institutions have a duty to check the power of the state, and that this
checking function is an important part of constitutional democracy); Robin W. Lovin,
Religion and American Public Life: Three Relationships, in RELIGION AND AMERICAN
PUBLIC LIFE 7, 13-21 (Robin W. Lovin ed., 1986) (arguing that religious communities
play a vital role in the furtherance of social and political freedom andjustice);James
E. Wood, Jr., The PropheticRole of Religion in Society, 30J. CHURCH & ST. 225 passim
(1988) (noting the importance of the "prophetic role of religion"-that is, "questioning
the established order, refusing to sanctify traditions not in harmony with the norms
of one's faith, advancing justice, and promoting the general welfare of society").
89 See Forell, supranote 88, at 21 (noting the tradition of Christian confrontations
with the state-"[fjrom John Chrysotom, who proclaimed God's Word in the statechurch of Byzantium and died in exile, to Bernard of Clairvaux, who criticized popes
at the zenith of their power, to Luther and Calvin, Menno Simons and Roger
Williams").
o But see infra parts LD-E (noting that Carter's model, if extended into the free
exercise context, could effectively penalize religions that fail to conform to its
instrumentalist ideal).
"' The First Amendment religion clauses clearly may affect the specific nature of
religious political and legal involvement, see infra parts I.C-D, but they do not
undermine Carter's general theoretical point that we should value religious
participation for its intermediary and contributive roles.
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it to the public. In particular, Carter seems not to take seriously
enough the likelihood that a dissenting religion may not be a
welcome religion, and that if the political presence of institutional
religions is being justified in large part by their ability to challenge
the state-which is to say the social, political, and economic status
quo-then who could be blamed for wanting to keep religions, or at
least certain religions, out of the public square? To be sure, Carter
even acknowledges, in agreement with Mark Tushnet, that "it is
precisely this ultimate radical possibility of refusing to accept the
will of the state that leads to America's political suspicion toward
religious belief."9 2 But Carter then does something quite bizarre:
rather than addressing directly the hypothesis that religion's
antistate potential is one cause of the culture of disbelief, Carter
simply reverses the causal chain and announces that it is a symptom.
The idea that a group of people will refuse to bow, either to law
or to what some are bold to call reason, is, of course, a very
subversive one in organized society. But religion, properly
understood, is a very subversive force; subversive, at least, in a
state committed to the proposition that religious ways of looking
at the world do not count. No wonder, then, that our political
culture seems to be afraid of it.93
In other words, while religion in Carter's view would be naturally
subversive in any political culture, only or especially in a culture of
disbelief-"in a state committed to the proposition that religious
ways of looking at the world do not count"-would this subversiveness actually translate into fear. This, of course, is simply not true.
The religiously devout Massachusetts Bay Colony,94 for one, feared
dissent with a passion, as it understood only too well the subversive
power of a dissenting religious voice. In short, the notion that a
political and legal culture that fears the subversive potential of
religion must not be taking religion seriously enough plainly
overlooks the reality that the oppression of religious dissenters has

92

9

P. 41.
P. 43.

' See, e.g., Emil Oberholzer, Jr., The Church in New England Society, in
TEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA:

SEVEN-

ESSAYS IN COLONIAL HISTORY 143, 145-47 (James M.

Smith ed., W.W. Norton & Co. 1972) (1959) (describing the framework of strict
ecclesiastical discipline that characterized the Puritan colony). Perhaps the most
celebrated case of religious dissent and expulsion from the colony involved Roger
Williams. See EDwIN S. GAUSTAD, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: ROGER WILLIAMS IN
AMERICA 24-58 (1991); Robert T. Miller,
1 J. CHURCH & ST. 19, 25-30 (1959).

Religious Conscience in ColonialNew England,
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historically been conducted not by secularist political regimes, but

rather by established religious orders-hence the need for the
separation of church and state.
Even more anomalous, however, is an argument that Carter
basically sneaks in at the end of chapter five. Invoking a type of
normative historical determinism, Carter states:
[W]hen the guardians of the public square inveigh against religious
dialogue, or when pundits worry about the influence of religion on
politics, they are worrying, as it were, against history. The battle
for the public square is already over. The rhetoric of religion is
simply there; it is far too late in America's political day to argue
over "shoulds." The important question is not whether religions
can act as autonomous, politically involved intermediary institutions, or whether religious people should have access to the public
square. Those questions history has already decided. 5
Needless to say, this passage evinces a drastically different
rationale for supporting religious participation in politics (one
arguably more drastic than supportive). The central difficulty is that
while history may teach and admonish, it cannot "decide," at least
not meaningfully, the kinds of questions posed by Carter. History
may reveal that the separation of religion from government, or the
political participation of religious citizens, has traditionally proved
socially beneficial, but it cannot command us to embrace those
institutions, particularly in an era when unprecedented circumstances-such as the spread of secularization and philosophical relativism-render the value of history increasingly uncertain. At the same
time, however, we should be equally hesitant to conclude that
history is entirely irrelevant and that Carter's invocation of history
is thus entirely misplaced. In the spirit of moderation, therefore, it
seems fair to propose that the lessons of history may suggest that
presumptive weight be given to certain practices or traditions,
rebuttable through sufficient evidence and persuasive reasoning.
Such a presumption seems a reasonable way to account for history
and yet avoid the twin pitfalls of determinism and nihilism. And to
rephrase Carter, then, one could argue that history looks favorably
on religious participation in politics, and that those who seek to
secularize entirely the political and legal processes ought to face a
96
presumption not in their favor.

95 P. 101.
' Cf Idleman, Religious Values, supra note 7, at 456 (proposing that, "in light of
religion's historical place injudicial decision making," it may be appropriate to place
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There are several other concerns raised by Carter's theory,
particularly when channeled through the First Amendment. These
problems, however, are properly the subjects of Sections C, D, and
E below. Let us turn now to the consequences of his theory within
the special context of the Establishment Clause.
C. The Establishment Clause
When the subject of one's inquiry is American law and politics,
it is not enough simply to devise a theoretically sound model of
religion and government and leave it at that. For the First Amendment begins with an explicit limitation: "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion ... ."97 This limitation
has in turn been interpreted to place restrictions on the acts of all
governmental bodies at the state and federal levels.9" Of course as
Carter points out,99 and as many scholars, lawyers, and judges are
aware, these words provide little guidance to contemporary
decision-makers concerning the nature of those limitations and the
proper interaction of government and religion. And like so many
other constitutional provisions, therefore, they are open season for
theorists who are constantly attempting to devise coherent,
legitimate, and workable models of nonestablishment for use by the
Supreme Court-an institution that, according to Carter, presently
00
lacks a meaningful theory.'
In the second part of his book, Carter enters this theoretical
fray, taking his own model on a trial run, as it were, and exploring

the burden ofjustification on those who seek to exclude religious values from the
decision-making of contemporaryjudges). A more convincing type of deterministic
argument would hold that religious values themselves will inevitably permeate the
political processes, either because "religious values" should be understood broadly,
thus making avoidance impossible, or because there will always be religious actors
who are unable to avoid adverting to their religious values when participating in the
political processes. See id. at 435-42, 454 & n.71, 473-78.
97
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
8 See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (incorporating the
Establishment Clause through the Fourteenth Amendment, thus rendering it
applicable to state and local governments).
" See, e.g, pp. 114-15 (surveying a variety of plausible yet conflicting interpretations of the Establishment Clause and noting that "[c]onstitutional provisions all too
rarely, alas, have easily discernible meanings").
100See pp. 109-14 (discussing the awkward nature of the test used in Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 609 (1971), the Supreme Court's repeated attempts to apply the
test, the Court's tendency to avoid applying the test when doing so "might prove too
disruptive," and the consequent lack of any consistent theory defining the Court's
Establishment Clause decisions).
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1°
the consistently divisive issues of religion in the public schools, '
10 2
on public property,
and in the public square. 0 3 To a large
extent, of course, his general theory of the relationship between

religion and government,' and particularly his theoretical justification for their institutional separation, translates quite naturally to
the Establishment Clause context. That translation is basically
captured in the following syllogism. First, religion should be
understood as having the potential capacity to serve as a mediating
institution between citizens and the state-a role that Carter argues
may benefit both citizen and state alike. Second, religion can fulfill
this intermediary role only if it remains separate from the state, at
least to the degree that it is not subservient to, or cannot be coopted by, the state. And third, the Establishment Clause (which he
understands as having been framed primarily to protect religion)0 5 should thus be interpreted to maintain that degree of
separation-no less and no more-that would optimize religion's
mediating function. In other words, the Establishment Clause
should set both a ceiling and a floor on the appropriate relationship
between religion and government, prohibiting excessive detachment
(that is, political and legal secularism) no less than excessive
entanglement.
The more that the [Establishment Clause] is used to disable
religious groups from active involvement in the programs of the
welfare state, or, for that matter, from active involvement in the
public square that is the crucible of public policy, the less the
religions will be able to play their proper democratic role of
mediating between the individual and the state and the less they
101 See

pp. 183-210.
o See pp. 33- 3 4 ,147-49 (discussing the St. Patrick's Day Parade in New York City);
pp. 94-95 (discussing religious displays, such as nativity scenes).
10 See pp. 213-32.
o See supra part I.B.
1o5 See pp. 39, 105-08 ("[T]he metaphorical separation of church and state
originated in an effort to protect religion from the state, not the state from religion.
The religion clauses of the First Amendment were crafted to permit maximum
freedom to the religious."). Carter's use of history in the establishment context (by
which he really means original intent) is no less problematic than his use of it in the
general theoretical context. See supra text accompanying notes 95-96. Here, however,
the problem is not one of incongruity or dubiousness but rather of ambivalence-of
raising history but feeling awkward about doing so. See pp. 115-20. The sense is that
he included history (again a euphemism for originalism), in order to appease
constitutional conservatives, while sufficiently discounting its binding quality, thereby
appeasing constitutional progressives.
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will be able to play their proper theological role of protecting the
people of God.'
As a consequence of this perspective, Carter necessarily
advocates a moderately strong version of religion-government
separation while at the same time finding a number of Supreme
Court doctrines or decisions untenable. For instance, while he
10 7
approves of the nonpreferentialism and noncoercion principles,
he would jettison from the Court's jurisprudence the inquiry into
motive, 0 8 the excessive entanglement prong of Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 0 9 and much of the concept of governmental endorsement. ° In turn, decisions such as Stone v. Graham,"' in which
the Court invalidated a school's practice of posting the Ten
Commandments on classroom walls, might be considered incorrect
as long as "the effect of the posting was [not] to teach students
religious law."" 2 In other words, for Carter, the mere fact that
some legislators acted out of religious motivation or that the posting
of the Ten Commandments would appear to be a governmental
endorsement of religion is not enough to render it invalid under the
P. 123.
o' See p. 93 (discussing nonpreferentialism as "religious toleration"); pp. 187-89
(discussing coercion in the context of school prayer).
" See pp. 111-14 (criticizing the creationism case of Edwards v. Aguillard, 482
U.S. 578, 581 (1987), in which the Court held that a law forbidding the teaching of
evolution "unless accompanied by instruction in the theory of 'creation science'"was
unconstitutional because most of the law's supporters were religiously motivated).
109 403 U.S. 602, 615 (1971) ("In order to determine whether the government
entanglement with religion is excessive, we must examine the character and purposes
of the institutions that are benefitted, the nature of the aid that the State provides,
and the resulting relationship between the government and the religious authority.").
Although it is not entirely clear from his book, Carter has elsewhere stated that he
"would delete from the [Lemon] test the excessive entanglement clause" for the reason
that it "causes nothing but trouble, so much trouble in my judgment it causes
religious groups to be discriminated against." A Conversation with Stephen Carter,
RELIGION & VALUES PUB. LIFE, Fall 1993, at 1, 3.
11 See p. 94 (noting the "Supreme Court's ridiculous hemming and hawing" in the
creche cases). In religious symbolism cases, such as those involving creches, Carter
argues that the appropriate test is not whether anyone is offended by the symbolism
(which could be a violation under the current endorsement standard), but rather
whether a religious symbolic display is "maintained at public expense" or "whether
the government is placing its imprimatur on a symbol of a particular religion." Pp.
94-95. Thus Carter has effectively abandoned the endorsement test, since his two
proposed standards are simply restatements of other nonestablishment principles:
maintaining a criche at public expense is either coeecion or the actual advancement
of religion, while the government's placing of its imprimatur on a symbol of a
particular religion is preferentialism.
1 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
12 p. 189.
106
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First Amendment; rather, their posting must result in the coercion
of students, must amount to the preferential treatment of certain
religious traditions, or must engender a relationship between the
state and religion that in some way undermines the autonomy of the
latter.
On the whole, this model of church-state separation would
appear to constitute a legitimate and workable interpretation of the
Establishment Clause, particularly when viewed in light of Carter's
more general theory of government and religion. The nonestablishment rationale that Carter offers-that of religious autonomy-is
particularly relevant in this modern age when the interests of
religion can be so easily overshadowed by the interests of the
increasingly pervasive state or so easily lost among fact-laden
concerns about implicit endorsement or effective coercion. In a
very real sense, then, Carter has done an invaluable service to his
audience and to those institutions that fall under the influence of
his book.
At the same time, however, Carter is arguably too narrow in his
interpretation of the clause and his resultant view of the Court's
current doctrines. This is true in at least two respects. First,
without discounting the importance of religious autonomy, we must
remember that there can be legitimate disagreement over how the
autonomy of religion can best be preserved. The prohibitions on
religious motivation and endorsement, for example, are unquestionably the source of a frustrating line of decisions.1 3 But they
cannot be dismissed so easily, for they could plausibly be understood as mechanisms to further religious autonomy by making more
difficult the governmental appropriation and manipulation of
religious symbols or concepts. While Carter's proposed nonestablishment doctrine-based chiefly on the principles of noncoercion
..
s Motivation analysis is problematic to the extent that (1) the actual motivations
of government actors are frequently unknowable, (2) the issue of whose motivations
are relevant is almost always debatable, and (3) the relationship between governmental motivation and any real harm to the plaintiff is often tenuous. For further critique
of motivation analysis specifically in the nonestablishment context, see pp. 110-14; Hal

Culbertson, Note, Religion in the PoliticalProcess: A Critiqueof Lemon's Purpose Test,
1990 U. ILL. L. REv. 915, 916-25. Likewise, endorsement analysis is problematic to
the extent that it invites arbitrariness, either because it must rely on the subjective
perceptions of plaintiffs, which maybe limitless and nonverifiable, or because it must
rely on ajudge's intuitive estimation of what a reasonable plaintiff would perceive.
For further critique of endorsement analysis in the nonestablishment context, see
Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedomat a Crossroads,59 U. CHI. L. REv. 115, 14757 (1992); Smith, Rise and Fall, supra note 12, at 210-18.
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and nonpreferentialism (that is, no preferential treatment either
among religions or between religion and nonreligion)-would
generally serve to maintain religious autonomy, there may be cases
where Carter's doctrine would fall short and where either an
endorsement or a motivation analysis would not. Second and
related, there is no obvious reason that the protection of religious
autonomy need be the primary or superior rationale. Although it
is no doubt an important animating theme, nothing in our constitutional tradition indicates that it cannot coexist with other rationales, 1 14 as long as it is not significantly undermined by their
effects. In short, while Carter is correct to highlight the goal of
religious autonomy, his singular concern with that goal must not
result in a constitutional myopia that fails to apprehend the many
meanings of our nonestablishment guarantee.
D. The Free Exercise Clause
Given his emphasis on religious autonomy, it should come as no
surprise that Carter favors a vigorous jurisprudence of free exercise,
similar to that spelled out by the pre-Rehnquist Court in Sherbert v.
Verner"' and Wisconsin v. Yoder."' These decisions announced
the principle that a law or governmental action substantially

"' Nonestablishment theories and rationales are both numerous and diverse. See,
e.g., Carl H. Esbeck, Five Views of Church-State Relations in Contemporary American
Thought, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REV. 371, 375-76 (addressing the views of strict separationism, pluralistic separationism, institutional separationism, nonpreferentialism, and
restorationism); Neal R. Feigenson, PoliticalStandingand Governmental Endorsement
of Religion: An Alternative to CurrentEstablishment ClauseDoctrine, 40 DEPAUL L. REV.
53, 55 (1990) (advocating a nonendorsement standard); Michael W. McConnell,
Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 933, 941 (1986)
(advocating a noncoercion standard); Sullivan, supra note 71, at 197-99 (arguing that
the Establishment Clause should be understood as creating a secular public order).
To be sure, the Court itself has recognized several rationales or standards for
nonestablishment. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2658-60 (1992)
(applying a noncoercion standard); County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh
Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 592-97 (1989) (explaining its nonendorsement standard);
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,612-13 (1971) (embracing institutional separation
by prohibiting excessive entanglement); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15
(1947) (adopting a nonpreferentialism standard).
115374 U.S. 398,399-402 (1963) (holding that denial ofappellant's application for
unemployment benefits after she was fired from her job because of her refusal to
work on Saturdays due to her religious beliefs was a violation of the Free Exercise
Clause).
116 406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972) (sustaining the Amish's claim that application
of a
compulsory school attendance law to the Amish community would violate their rights
under the Free Exercise Clause).
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burdening a claimant's religious practice, particularly one of central
importance to her sincere religious beliefs, should be applied to her
only if the governmental action is necessary to a compelling
interest." 7 If the government fails to meet this test, then the
religious claim must be accommodated."' What makes this an
almost radical proposition today, of course, is the 1990 decision of
Employment Division v. Smith." 9 Smith held, essentially on formalistic grounds, that the Sherbert-Yoder standard is relevant only if the
law or governmental action is targeted specifically at religion 120 or
if the religious claim happens to be of a certain kind.' 2 ' Other1 7 See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403 (noting that "any incidental burden on the free
exercise of appellant's religion may [only] be justified by a 'compelling state interest
in the regulation of a subject within the State's constitutional power to regulate'"
(citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963))); Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214 (noting
that in order for the state to be able to compel school attendance of the Amish's
children beyond the eighth grade, and thereby substantially burden their religious
practices, the state must show that "there is a state interest of sufficient magnitude
to override the interest claiming protection under the Free Exercise Clause").
n' See pp. 126-35 (discussing the accommodation of religion and advocating a
"wider set of religious exemptions from law of general application"). As part of the
calculus in determining when and to what extent the compelling interest test should
be activated, Carter would apparently advocate a sliding scale of free exercise
protection, turning on the centrality of the claim to the faith of the relevant religious
community. See p. 143 ("As the acts of faith that the state seeks to regulate or forbid
become less central, the state's burden ofjustification grows less."). For criticism of
a centrality standard, see infra note 206 and accompanying text.
119 494 U.S. 872 (1990). For an early critique of Smith, see Michael W. McConnell,
Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1111 (1990)
(criticizing "the opinion's use of legal sources-text, history, and precedent-and its
theoretical argument" as well as noting that "Smith is contrary to the deep logic of the
First Amendment").
1' Smith noted that although it would be true "that a State would be 'prohibiting
the free exercise [of religion]' if it sought to ban [certain] acts ... only when they are
engaged in for religious reasons," the Free Exercise Clause does not relieve an
individual of the obligation to comply with a law that incidentally "requires (or
forbids) the performance of an act that his religious belief forbids (or requires)" if the
law is "not specifically directed at [his] religious practices." Smith, 494 U.S. at 877-78.
Thus, for example, the Court had no difficulty invalidating four municipal ordinances
enacted to prevent a particular religious denomination from locating in a particular
city. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217,
2222 (1993) (noting that city council ordinances prohibiting the killing of animals for
ritual sacrifice "had an impermissible object; and in all events the principle of general
applicability was violated because the secular ends asserted in defense of the laws
were pursued only with respect to conduct motivated by religious beliefs").
1 The most apparent kinds, as set forth in Smith, are (1) claims that unemployment benefits have been denied, and (2) claims involving another constitutional
liberty, especially free speech or parental substantive due process, in conjunction with
the free exercise claim. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-83. For other potential exceptions,
see Laycock, supra note 65, at 41-54. Significantly, the Court in Smith did not
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wise, so long as the law is neutral, of general applicability, and
within the government's authority, free exercise claimants can
122
expect to lose.
Carter's almost nostalgic vision of a robust free exercisejurisprudence is widely shared among constitutional scholars and judges.
Less widely shared, though, are the reasons offered for such a
jurisprudence. Carter, once again in keeping with his theory of
religion and government, offers a justification for free exercise
based on the social utility that derives from religion's mediating
capacity. "[I]f... the religions are at their most useful when they
serve as democratic intermediaries and preach resistance, then it is
at precisely that moment, the moment when the religious tradition
most diverges from the mainstream, that protection is both most
needed and most deserved."12 ' According to Carter, in fact, a
broad free exercise doctrine is absolutely essential to religion's
fulfillment of its instrumental role.
In no other way can we enable the religions to stand as intermediaries between sovereign and citizen, thus limiting the prospect of

necessarily narrow the application of the Sherbert-Yoderstandard any further than the
holdings of its prior cases. See Sullivan, supra note 71, at 215 (noting that "[tihe
Supreme Court has overwhelmingly rejected free exercise exemption claims" and that
Sherbert and Yoder were merely exceptions to that rule). What the Court did do,
however, was effectively to preclude the possibility of extending the application of
that standard beyond the exceptions enumerated in Smith.
" This should change under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which was
signed into law on November 16, 1993. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb). The
Act effectively overruled the Smith decision, or, more precisely, it "create[d] a
statutory right where the Court declined to create a constitutional right." Douglas
Laycock, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 221, 246. In
relevant part, the Act provides: "Government may substantially burden a person's
free exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the
person-(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest, and (2) is the
least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest." 107 Stat.
1488-89; see also Robert Boston, PastDue Bill: Religious FreedomRestorationAct Finally
Becomes Law, CHURCH & ST., Dec. 1993, at 7; Peter Steinfels, Clinton Signs Law
ProtectingReligious Practices,N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1993, at A18. Needless to say, if the
constitutionality of the Act is upheld, we can expect to see both an expansion of the
meaning of "compelling governmental interest" and an even greater body of law
developing around the concept of"substantial burden." For a discussion of this latter
concept's function prior to the Act, see Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem
of Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REV. 933, 937-46 (1989).
12 P. 132; see also p. 134 ("[T]he reason for accommodation [that is, granting a
religious exemption from a generally applicable law] becomes not the protection of
individual conscience, but the preservation of the religions as independent power
bases that exist in large part in order to resist the state.").
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majoritarian tyranny; and in no other way can we translate the
Founders' ideal of religious freedom in a relatively simple society
into a new ideal for a new era, one characterized by a regulatory
regime far more4 intrusive than the Founders could possibly have
12
contemplated.
While this broad free exercise vision of Carter's is admirable,
the logic of his actual free exercise model is simply inadequate to
bring that vision about. First, Carter's choice of a single overarching rationale'2 5 (almost regardless of its content) suggests that
the Free Exercise Clause should be interpreted through the lens of
only one value or rationale, when in fact a multiplicity of rationales
seems the only feasible way to empower it as a meaningful and
independent source of substantive protection. It is tempting,
particularly in western culture, to seek the elusive "mega-rationale"the one overarching rationale that can explain, predict, or justify an
entire genre of phenomena, whether that be physics, philosophy,
economics, music, or law. As is more thoroughly explained in Part
124p.

126.

I2 As the text indicates, I read Carter as singularly advocating an instrumentalist
rationale for the protection of religious liberty, the same rationale that he uses to
support both his general theory of religion and government and his specific
interpretation of the Establishment Clause. I have no doubt that others, including
Carter himself, might not read The Culture of Disbeliefso narrowly. Nevertheless, for
a number of reasons I believe that this reading isjustifiable. First, he employs strong
language when describing his instrumentalist rationale-for example, "ifreligions are
at their most useful ... then it is precisely at that moment," p. 132-the kind of
rhetoric one would not normally expect an author to use if his intent were to make
clear that there are other important rationales that should not be excluded. Second,
the instrumentalist rationale is essentially the only rationale he offers. Under other
circumstances, of course, such an omission might be entirely benign or meaningless:
the mere exclusion of other justifications would not suggest that the reason offered
was intended to be exclusive. However, both because the omitted rationales are so
powerful-for example, that persons have an inalienable right to religious liberty, or
that religious liberty is a necessary aspect of what it means to be a free and
autonomous being-and because the stated rationale is so specific and to some extent
extreme-namely, that religious liberty ought to be protected because it is beneficial
for the political order-Carter's omission cannot be dismissed as meaningless. Third
and finally, there is no obvious reason why Carter could not have included, at some
point in his 328-page book, even a one-sentence declaration that religion is valuable
whether or not it is valuable to the state, and that religious liberty ought to be
protected regardless of its instrumental relation to the democratic order. The only
possible reason, and I discuss this later in the Essay, is that Carter may have chosen
the instrumentalist rationale specifically to appeal to a constituency of nonreligious
readers and therefore the exclusion of other rationales was a tactical decision to avoid
alienating or confusing this constituency. See infra text accompanying notes 150-52.
If this is the case, however, then my narrow interpretation is entirely in order, for
Carter did in fact mean to offer a singular interpretation of religious liberty.
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II, however, the Free Exercise Clause and the genre of human
activity it encompasses are simply not amenable to some type of

grand unified theory (as the astrophysicists call it), and hence we
must look warily upon models, such as Carter's, that appear to
reduce free exercise to the confines of a single rationale.
Second and more serious, Carter's particular choice of rationale-one grounded in social utility-would be nothing short of
disastrous if actually implemented, for it would offer little protection to those who need it most and would transform religious free
exercise, rhetorically if not actually, into a mere tool of society. In
particular, at least three problems can be identified. First, there
would be no logical reason to extend free exercise protection to
those religions or religious practices-and perhaps not even those
beliefs-that do not produce the kind of social utility upon which
protection is otherwise predicated. 26 To what extent, for example, could Carter's model justify the protection of free exercise
when the claimant's underlying religion is of an individual, and not
an institutional, nature?2 7 Likewise, to what extent could Carter's
model logically justify the protection of religions that, although
institutional or corporate, make no pretense of serving an intermediary role between their adherents and the state? Followers of
various Native American religions, for instance, would find Carter's
mediating rationale largely baffling-and hence no protection should
be forthcoming-since their conceptions of spirituality are simply
incongruent with the church-state dichotomy and all of its conceptual and institutional consequences.'
(Ironically, Carter repeatedly
126 There may, of course, be other reasons to extend protection, see infra part II,
but the instant they are invoked, Carter's single rationale model is no longer
governing the free exercise analysis. And that is the whole point-that single-rationale
models, perhaps instrumentalist ones in particular, will invariably prove to be
inadequate.
127 Not all religions, after all, are institutional. See MILTON R. KONVITZ, RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY AND CONSCIENCE: A CONSTITUTIONAL INQUIRY 85-86 (1968) (noting that "[i]t
matters not constitutionally whether a church has a million members or is a Church
of One Member; ... whether they listen to hymns and prayers or simply sit and
meditate and listen to the inner voice and see only the inner light"); Gail Merel, The
Protection of Individual Choice: A Consistent Understandingof Religion Under the First
Amendment, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 805, 834 (1978) (noting that "[a] workable test of
religion for purposes of the free exercise clause might... be stated to include any
multidimensional system of beliefs that an individual claimant sincerely asserts to be
religiously held"). The persistent public sense that religion must be institutional is,
to be sure, one of the paradoxes of privatization: religion is a private matter for the
individual, yet a system of beliefs is normally not considered religious unless it
extends
beyond the individual.
128
See generally AKE HULTKRANTZ, THE RELIGIONS OF THE AMERICAN INDIANS
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invokes Native American religions as the paradigmatically nonmainstream religions most in need of constitutional protection.)'29 At
the same time, there exist various other denominations that in fact
accept the separation of religion and government, but that are so
separationist as to render the notions of institutional mediation and
Even mainstream religious
social utility basically inapplicable.'
groups engage in a variety of rituals and practices that are at best
indirectly related to their mediating function, such that logically
there would be little or no need to accord these practices protection
under the First Amendment. To be sure, the courts in such cases
could resort to tests of relatedness and necessity as the basis for

(Monica Setterwall trans., 1979) (1967) (surveying a number of Native American
religious traditions and concepts, thereby providing the reader with an insight into
the vast differences between these traditions and concepts and those found in western
religions, such as Christianity); Rhodes, supra note 30, at 18 (noting the enormous
conceptual gap between western spirituality and Native American spirituality). At one
point in conjunction with a discussion of Native American religion, Carter offers a
standard that would presumably protect certain practices of nonmediating
institutional religions: "the central acts of faith of a religious community-the aspects
that do the most to produce shared meaning within the corporate body of worshipare entitled to the highest solicitude by the courts." P. 143. The only problem is that
no mention is made of his mediating rationale; the protected practices under this
standard are entirely internal to the religion, and there is no logical connection to the
religion's direct or indirect relationship to law and politics.
'2 See pp. 9, 11, 125-27, 131-32.
The Old Order Amish, the claimants in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972), would likely fall under this category. See WILLIAM M. KEPHART, EXTRAORDINARY GROUPS: THE SOCIOLOGY OF UNCONVENTIONAL LIFE-STYLES 6-49 (1976) ("[T]he

Old Order Amish ... have little real interest in politics. A good deal of the time they
do not even bother to vote, particularly in national elections.... [T]he Amish have
little interest in improving the world or making it a better place to live in. Their
entire orientation is other worldly."); Paton Yoder, The Amish View of the State, in THE
AMISH AND THE STATE 23, 31-36 (Donald B. Kraybill ed., 1993) (noting that "[t]he
Amish try to minimize their participation in affairs of state and prefer to keep their
distance from government"). Yoder also notes that the Amish believe "the state and
the church have nothing of consequence in common." Id. at 39; see also Michael W.
McConnell, Chris4 Culture,and Courts: A NiebuhrianExamination ofFirstAmendment
Jurisprudence,42 DEPAUL L. REV. 191, 195-96 (1992) ("The Amish do not participate
in public life and do not wish to be influenced by it."). Again the irony is unavoidable, for this is yet another group that Carter holds up as paradigmatically in need
of protection. Another religious community that might fall under this category is the
Village of KiryasJoel, New York, composed almost entirely of members of the Satmar
Hasidic sect. See Grumet v. Board of Educ. of the KiryasJoel Village Sch. Dist., 618
N.E.2d 94,96 (N.Y.), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 544 (1993) (Nos. 93-517, 93-527,93-539).
Indeed, the Grumet case involves the constitutionality of a school district, created by
the state to be coterminous with the religious community, after it became clear that
sending the community's handicapped children to the secular public schools would,
as in Yoder, effectively interfere with the community's ability to maintain its separate
and distinct existence. See id. at 97.
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constitutional protection, much like the (unenumerated) freedom
of association is protected because it is presumed necessary to one's
exercise of the (enumerated) freedom of speech.''
But the
resultant uncertainty and broad judicial discretion seem terribly
risky when the overarching goal is one of protecting religious
liberty.
Carter's theory need not be interpreted so dismally, of course,
and at least two alternative or modified interpretations are available.
First, the mediation rationale could be understood as prescriptive
rather than merely descriptive, such that religions in the United
States ideally should act as mediation institutions regardless of their
current function. The problem is that, although this is possible and
indeed might be the cultural effect of pushing instrumentalism,1 32
it is unfashionably imperialistic and is highly incongruent with the
proautonomy bent of Carter's book.' 3 Alternatively, Carter might
propose that these otherwise unprotected religions either should be
protected incidentally in the course of protecting more mainstream
religions-for the very reason thatjudicial line-drawing would be too
risky or impossible-or should be protected through the operation
of other supplementary rationales. The problem with these options
is that despite their obviousness and simplicity, they are not raised
in the book. Indeed, precisely because of their obviousness and
simplicity, it is only rational to conclude that Carter's omission of
them was both intentional and meaningful.'

" See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449,460 (1958) ("It is beyond
debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas
is an inseparable aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech."). And what about the
free exercise of prisoners-a class of persons purposefully disenfranchised from the
political processes? To what extent would their religious free exercise yield social
utility and thus warrant protection? Carter would apparently protect their free
exercise. See p. 270 (noting that "[r]equiring prison officials to make reasonable
efforts to honor the requests of prisoners for enough freedom to pursue their
religious faiths would be a positive good"). Curiously, however, he does not support
this stance with his mediation theory.
122

See infra part I.E.

Any attempted transformation of another's culture or religion is, in this postimperialistic age of tolerance and autonomy, basically an anachronism, reminiscent
of the Inquisition or of colonial attempts to Christianize Native Americans. This is
especially true to the extent that Carter hopes the state (particularly the courts) will
adopt his interpretation of the religion clauses, since state-supported efforts to
transform the nature of religious practice would indeed amount to imperialism (in
the classic sense of the term) and would seriously conflict with our modern liberal
commitment to individual autonomy and governmental neutrality.
"' See supra note 125.
133
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The second major problem with Carter's instrumentalist free
exercise model is closely related to, and indeed explains, the first.
It is that of inherent bias, the bias necessarily contained in a
mainstream Protestant understanding of religion and its relationship
to government. Stated in more specific terms, Carter is an
Episcopalian and he has generated a largely Episcopalian theoryone reflecting the history of the separation of church and state in
western society and particularly the mainstream, institutional
American religious experience.1
In turn, it is hardly surprising
that the shortcomings listed above-specifically the logical exclusion
of certain religions-are not mere coincidence, but rather the
necessary result of Carter's starting point.13 6 What is surprising,
however, is the enormous gap between the reality of this bias and
13- By and large, the formal separation of religion and government, as a political
concept, has been accepted by most American Protestant denominations since at
least, and in some cases well before, the nineteenth century. See RICHARD E.
MORGAN, THE SUPREME COURT AND RELIGION 10-11 (1972) (noting the historical and
contemporary Protestant consensus over institutional separation); Robin W. Lovin,
Rethinking the Histoy of Church and State, 76 CAL. L. REv. 1185, 1190-91 (1988) (book
review) (discussing the "Protestant-liberal consensus" regardinggovernment-religion
relations, particularly institutional separation, that prevailed until the mid-twentieth
century). The Episcopal Church, especially in the northern states such as Connecticut, has generally embraced this mainstream consensus position. In part this stems
from its acceptance of a "separate spheres" conception of religion and governmentthe state having civil jurisdiction over the temporal, the church having ecclesiastical
jurisdiction over the spiritual-while in part this stems from specific historical
experiences, such as its effective break from the Church of England (especially
following the American Revolution) and its own relative disenfranchisement among
some of the northern colonies. See AHLSTROM, supra note 37, at 225 (discussing
origins of Episcopal church in the United States and noting that "[mI]ore than any
other in America," the Anglican constituency in Connecticut, which spawned the
Episcopal church, "stood without official or governmental support.., and suffered
considerable harassment by the authorities of church and state"); id. at 623 (noting
that during the early nineteenth century, while "[iun England the national [Anglican]
church had retained all its prerogatives, vested interests, encumbrances, and
temptations ... [i]n the United States, the Episcopal was one voluntary church among
others").
'm Recall Carter's statement, in the context of the Establishment Clause,
concerning the "proper" functions of religions--"their proper democratic role of
mediating between the individual and the state and... their proper theological role
of protecting the people of God." P. 123. Needless to say, many religions would not
consider these roles to be "proper" in any sense of the term and might even find
them incomprehensible if not insulting. In particular, while this two-function view
of religion vis-4-vis the state may resonate among certain faiths, especially mainstream
Protestant Christian denominations, it would presumably make little sense to
followers of religions that are either nontheistic or individualistic or that have no
desire to assume a "democratic role of mediating between the individual and the
state." See supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text.
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Carter's unquestionably good intentions. For example, while he
explicitly wants very much to protect nonmainstream religions, it is
precisely these religions-such as his paradigmatically nonmainstream Native American religions-that are the least likely to satisfy
his model." 7 Indeed, to the extent such religions actually conform to his rationale, the likely reason, at least for Native American
religions, is their (involuntary) Christianization, so that their
protection would merely constitute a more subtle and ironic
expression of bias. What is more, Carter is well aware of the idea
of inherent bias, both generally'
and specifically," 9 and thus
his failure to address the bias inherent in his own model is largely
inexplicable.
Third and finally, the use of an instrumentalist rationale,
particularly when invoked exclusively, can bring about an assortment of adverse cultural side-effects above and beyond the restriction of religious liberty. 40 Let us now turn to Section E, the final
Section of this Part of the Essay, and address some of these
potential cultural consequences.
E. The Cultural Consequences of Instrumentalism
If logic were the only shortcoming of Carter's model, then a few
simple modifications might suffice. There is, however, a more
subtle and more serious problem. Briefly stated, the problem is that
by talking about religion in terms of social utility, we not only place
logical limits on the special treatment of religion, we potentially
alter the way our culture perceives of religion generally. Indeed, we
may even alter the way religious citizens and denominations see
themselves. This final Section explores the cultural consequences

's*

For a provocative piece exploring the gap between western and Native

American values, see Robin P. Malloy, Lettersfrom the Longhouse: Law, Economics, and

Native American Values, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 1569.
"5Recall Carter's dismantling of the idea of "neutrality." See supra text

accompanying notes 64-67, 71.
19 Recall Carter's express attempt to disclaim and expunge Tocqueville's "proChristian bias." See supra part I.B.
1" Instrumentalism, in and of itself, is neither evil nor undesirable. But its
propriety is most certainly contextual. Thus, in the context of politics, instrumentalism may be an entirely appropriate, if not unavoidable, means to measure the
value of religious participation and proposals. Problems arise only when that same
instrumentalism spills over into less appropriate contexts, such as religious liberty,
and pollutes or overtakes other values that properly ought to inform those contexts.
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that an instrumentalist vision of religion, such as Carter's, might
bring about.
Carter's instrumentalist model, as noted earlier, would likely
prove functional as a paradigm for justifying and explaining one
role of religion in law and politics, at least as a nonconstitutional
matter. But ideas can engender cultural norms. Whether we are
speaking of religion or race or sexual orientation, the paradigms we
employ and the words we use may inadvertently alter the cultural
perception or status of our subject.141 As one pair of commentators notes, "the relationship between law and political culture in
America is curiously symbiotic. While our political culture defines
the scope of interpretations considered legally legitimate, the
argumentative and interpretive forms the legal system provides are
so elastic that their creative use can powerfully alter the political
landscape. " 14 ' In the case of Carter's theory, the invocation of an
instrumentalist rationale to justify the special treatment of religion,
especially when given the imprimatur of the courts, may induce
people to conceive of religion in instrumentalist terms generally,
well beyond the context of political participation or free exercise. 4 If, as Carter proposes, we as a political and legal culture
141 For a discussion of the relationship between the nature of religion and the
nature of society, see WUTHNOW, supra note 40, at 57-61. See also PETER L. BERGER,

THE SACRED CANOPY:

ELEMENTS OF A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF RELIGION 33

(Anchor Books 1969) (1967) (explaining that "[r]eligion legitimates social institutions
by bestowing upon them an ultimately valid ontological status"). For a more general
exposition on cultural construction, see PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY: A TREATISE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE

(Anchor Books 1967) (1966). For discussions specifically on law and social
construction, see MARY A. GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF
POLITICAL DISCOURSE 94-95 (1991) (discussing effect of legal discourses on cultural
expectations); and Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientationand the Politics of Biology: A
Critique of the Argument from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 1994)
(discussing the nature and possible effects of social and legal categorization on racial
and sexual identity).
14 Gregory A. Mark & Christopher L. Eisgruber, Introduction: Law and Political
Culture, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 420-21 (1988) (footnotes omitted).
143 We cannot assume, moreover, that courts will not be influenced by Carter's
book. See Hedges v. Wauconda Community Unit Sch. Dist. No. 118, 9 F.3d 1295,
1303 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing with approval pp. 111-15 of The Culture of Disbelief and
explaining that a regulation's religion-related motive cannot be considered except in
light of an actual effect on religion). Likewise, a good argument can be made that
President Clinton's relatively recent interest in recruiting inner-city churches in his
battle against violence and drug commerce in urban America is due in part to

Carter's book, which the President read late in the summer of 1993. See Walsh, supra
note 53, at 40-41 (discussing Clinton's interest in black churches as stabilizing forces
within inner-city communities as well as his fascination with The Culture of Disbelie).
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should value religion for its social utility as a mediating institution,
then it is only logical that social utility will in turn become a
standard by which the value of religion is measured. Moreover, any
such effect would presumably be heightened in the realm of free
exercise, since (1) free exercise by definition involves a claim against
the state or society and thus is highly vulnerable to inquiries
concerning its social utility, (2) free exercise is often the paradigmatic noninstrumentalist activity, such that attempts to convert its
worth into instrumentalist terms may be unusually destructive, and
(3) the nonmainstream religions, which generally lack political
power and thus most require the protection of the Free Exercise
Clause, would be disproportionately affected since their religious
practices are least likely to create conventional social utility. In
turn, the resultant harm would be not simply a net loss of religious
liberty, but also a pressure on religious citizens and bodies to alter
the form if not the substance of their religions-by acting as
mediating institutions, for example-so as to gain the favor of the
state and the public.'
In effect, there could come about nothing
145
of religion.
reconstruction
cultural
a
than
less
Lest these consequences seem implausible or too remote, one
need only consider the cultural transformations engendered by the
legal interpretation of two other provisions of the First Amendment,
the Establishment Clause and the Free Speech Clause. Prior to
Everson v. Board of Education,146 for example, the application of the

By raising this connection, I am not suggesting that President Clinton is misguided
in his efforts. I am suggesting, however, that the book may have prompted him to
realize the instrumental value of religious institutions in relation to some of his social
and political goals.
144 A good example of the law's capacity to alter the form of religion is the Native
American Church (the religion involved in Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990)), essentially a hybrid of Christianity and traditional Native American ways,
which engages in the sacramental use of peyote. See SAM D. GILL, NATIVE AMERICAN
RELIGIONS 169-71 (1982). Professor Gill notes that following governmental efforts in
the early twentieth century to outlaw peyote's use, "[m]ore and more groups of
peyotists incorporated in order to obtain a churchlike base upon which to maintain
the legality of their religious practices." GILL, supra, at 169-70.
1451 am not saying, of course, that religion is itself a social construct, at least not
in its essence. Rather, I am contending merely that the linguistic and conceptual
dimensions of culture can adversely affect the way people, including religious people,
understand religion and its relationship to law, politics, and the larger culture. Nor
am I adverse to ever raising social utility as ajustification for religious participation
in law and politics. See Idleman, Religious Values, supra note 7, at 468-73 (setting forth
five social utility-based arguments for the use of religious values in judicial decisionmaking). But I do think it is a mistake to frame religion, and especially free exercise,
substantially or solely in those terms.
146330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947) (holding that a state statute reimbursing parents for fares
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Establishment Clause to state governmental actions not constituting
a clear-cut religious "establishment" was a mere proposition. Today,
however, not only is it black-letter constitutional law, it is a cultural
norm. For many citizens-including those who have never read the
case law and perhaps not even the Establishment Clause-the first
impression that comes to mind when they perceive an interaction
of religion and government is "establishment" or, even more telling,
something regarding a "wall of separation." These are not legal
conclusions, but nonneutral cultural concepts engendered by legal
discourse. Even those who reject the Court's decisions nevertheless
speak comfortably through the terms and concepts that the Court

has pronounced. Likewise, consider the following analysis of the
relationship between culture and the legal interpretation of the Free
Speech Clause:
When an individual asserts the right to free speech, ...
the
assertion is usually not a legal claim against the government. It is
usually nothing more than a claim to be able to speak one's mind
free from the interference of others. This claim, however, is
legitimated not so much by the content of the speech as by the
prohibition on governmental censorship embodied in the first
amendment, which has been transformed into a claim that no one
may authoritatively hush another. The claim is, nonetheless,
phrased in the terms of a right, that is, a claim with legal force.
In that sense a cultural tradition, one with decidedly indistinct
historical roots and a controversial philosophical pedigree, has
developed, at least in part, because it is constitutionally en1 47
sconced.
We should not suppose, moreover, that such cultural side-effects are
limited to the clauses of the First Amendment. To the contrary, we
could justifiably surmise that virtually all legal actions or declarations effectively produce or transform culture, often in unintended
and adverse ways.
What is most puzzling about all of this is that the principal
theme of Carter's book is that law and politics do in fact create
cultural consequences-that "[t]he rhetoric matters" 14'-and that
149
cultural constructions of religion are both real and important.

paid for public transportation of children attending public and Catholic schools did
not violate the Establishment Clause).
147Mark & Eisgruber, supra note 142, at 421.

p. 7.
Carter is certainly aware of the risks associated with using instrumentalism in
other contexts. See, e.g., pp. 268-69 (noting that "our essential instrumentalist
148
149
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And just as there was an enormous gap, then, between the expansive scope of his free exercise vision and the confining logic of his
free exercise model, here there is a stark incongruity between his
understanding of cultural perception (indeed his goal to have
religion "taken seriously") and the possible adverse effects of his
own theory. Given his otherwise thoughtful approach to the
subject, we might take a moment and inquire as to why Carter has
allowed such an incongruity to exist. One possibility is that his
strong desire to present a single unifying model of religion and
government occasioned a kind of myopia as to the costs of such an
undertaking. Alternatively, he may have presumed that other
factors, such as judicial prudence or supplementary rationales,
would inevitably buffer the logical and conceptual effects of his
instrumentalist formulation. Yet, even if we could explain away this
incongruity, we should still be curious about the more fundamental
question of why Carter chose an instrumentalist rationale in the first
place, rather than, say, a theological or individual liberty rationale. t"' One plausible explanation, one which is again ironic, is
that Carter selected instrumentalism so as to appease the very
culture of disbelief that Carter advocates be countered, if not
eliminated. Rather than attempt to transform the culture of
disbelief by emphasizing the intrinsic importance of religion, Carter
has simply packaged religion in order to satisfy those disbelieving
readers who basically ask, "What's in it for me?" Indeed, what else
besides an instrumentalist justification of religion would appeal to
a political and legal culture that is perceived to operate as if religion
had no inherent value?15 What kind of rationale other than social

conception of state-the conception that asks of every goal how it can best be done
rather than why it should be done-is, potentially, quite destructive of religious
comunities [sic]"). Accordingly, it is simply inexplicable why he does not show equal
concern about the risks that may result from conceiving of religion in instrumentalist
terms.
" Carter is obviously aware of the theological roots of religious liberty. See, e.g.,
pp. 106, 116-17 (discussingJefferson's views on freedom of conscience).
...
In relation to his own time and culture, John Stuart Mill observed that:
If religion, or any particular form of it, is true, its usefulness follows without
other proof.... The utility of religion did not need to be asserted until the
arguments for its truth had in great measure ceased to convince.... An
argument for the utility of religion is an appeal to unbelievers to induce
them to practice a well-meant hypocrisy, or to semibelievers to make them
avert their eyes from what might possibly shake their unstable belief, or,
finally, to persons in general to abstain from expressing any doubts they
may feel, since a fabric of immense importance to mankind is so insecure
at its foundations that men must hold their breath in its neighborhood for
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utility would appeal to a political and legal culture that has
supposedly lost any sense of transcendence?15
Carter may not
have consciously realized the strategic value of choosing
instrumentalism, of course, but it is difficult to avoid the troubling
and ironic significance that such a choice betrays. In the final
analysis, we must remember that Carter's book was written to
convince, not merely to inform. In essence he seeks to replace, with
his own theory of religion and government, a number of popular
conceptions and legal doctrines that he considers misguided, but
that he knows are deeply embedded in our legal and political
culture. And like a surgeon transplanting an organ, therefore,
Carter must offer his patient-the culture of disbelief-a model that
will not be rejected merely by virtue of that patient's own extant
epistemological and ideological commitments.
Given this array of potential adverse consequences, it would
simply be irresponsible to use Carter's model as a basis for
interpreting the Free Exercise Clause, at least not without the use
of other rationales that can offset its significant shortcomings. At
best, Carter has simply placed too much stock in the incidental
political benefits that may accrue from some forms of free exercise.
At worst, he has generated a model that would appear to contradict
if not undermine itself. For Carter's central goal, that of religious
autonomy, is logically incompatible with a model that protects
religion because it is good for the state. Such an approach neither
embraces nor fosters religious autonomy (at least not if "autonomy"
is broadly understood), and its application to the realm of religious
liberty is therefore inherently problematic. In light of this conclufear of blowing it down.
John S. Mill, Utility of Religion, in NATURE AND UTILITY OF RELIGION 45,45 (George
Nakhnikian ed., 1958).
152This is not to say that our political and legal culture has not actually lost its
sense of the transcendent. See, e.g., HaroldJ. Berman, Religion and Law: The First
Amendment in HistoricalPerspective, 35 EMORY LJ. 777 (1986). Berman notes that
[w]ithin the past two generations the public philosophy of America has
shifted radically from a religious to a secular theory of law, from a moral to
a political or instrumental theory.... Rarely, if ever, does one hear it said
that law is a reflection of an objective justice or of the ultimate meaning or
purpose of life. Usually it is thought to reflect, at best, the community's
sense of what is useful.
Id. at 789. But the condition need not dictate the cure, and an instrumentalist
culture need not have its instrumentalism affirmed merely because it is expedient to
do so.
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sion, let us examine alternative ways of conceptualizing the First
Amendment free exercise guarantee.
II. BEYOND THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: RECONCEPTUALIZING
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY

From the scholar's vantage point, the Supreme Court is most
reproachable when it fails to articulate coherent, comprehensive
rationales to explain its exercise of judicial review under various
provisions of the Constitution. The Free Exercise Clause, for some
time now, has been such a provision. 5 Indeed, the absence of a
concrete paradigm of religious liberty is one obvious reason for a
free exercise jurisprudence that over the last several years has been
characterized by doctrinal revisionism,'
division among the
15 6
Justices, 155 and acute dissatisfaction among commentators.
Carter, as noted, offers a model of free exercise grounded in the
idea that robust religious liberty and political participation are
necessary for the nation's moral and political health-an essentially
instrumentalist rationale rooted in historical observation and
political pragmatism. And while Carter's model may be a bit
extreme, it is by no means unrepresentative of current attempts to
justify free exercise. Also as noted, however, there is an enormous
gap between Carter's justification and Carter's vision-so great, in
fact, that the model is substantially dysfunctional. But if Carter's
utility-based model genuinely typifies modern attempts to justify a
...
SeeJohn H. Garvey, Free Exercise and the Values of Religious Liberty, 18 CONN. L.
REV. 779, 782 (1986) (noting that the "Supreme Court has not been much troubled
by the issue" of why the free exercise ought to merit constitutional protection);John
H. Mansfield, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the Philosophy of the
Constitution,72 CAL. L. REV. 847, 848 (1984) ("That there is a need for a 'single, more
encompassing construction' of the establishment clause, few readers of the [Supreme]
Court's opinions in this area would care to deny" (quoting Committee for Pub. Educ.
& Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 662 (1980))).
" See McConnell, supra note 119, at 1111, 1129 (criticizing Employment Div. v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), as having ignored text, history, precedent, and the logic
of the First Amendment).
155
See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 (5-4 decision) (indicating a deep division among the
Justices as to the proper interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause).
" See Mary A. Glendon & Raul F. Yanes, StructuralFreeExercise, 90 MICH. L. REV.
477, 478 (1991) (noting that "all sides" consider much of the Court's jurisprudence
to be "unprincipled, incoherent, and unworkable"); Smith, Rise and Fall,supra note
12, at 149-50 ("It is by now notorious that legal doctrines and judicial decisions in the
area of religious freedom are in serious disarray. In perhaps no other area of
constitutional law have confusion and inconsistency achieved such undisputed
sovereignty.").
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strong free exercise guarantee, and if his model indeed falls short,
then what alternatives, if any, are left?
That inquiry is the focus of this second Part of the Essay, which
is divided into two Sections. Section A provides a concise overview
of the many ways in which religious liberty can be understood and
the various criteria that should be considered when interpreting the
Free Exercise Clause. Section B then argues that, at the very least,
a meaningful interpretation of that clause requires an understanding
of religious liberty as an inherent good, a human undertaking of
intrinsic worth. Additionally, Section B addresses the contours of
such a model, including three potential shortcomings. I should
emphasize that the principal underlying purpose of this final Part
is not necessarily to resolve particular cases arising under the Free
Exercise Clause, or even to offer a concrete doctrinal framework for
the application of that clause. Rather, it is to probe below these
first few strata and to discern, within certain boundaries, the
considerations according to which any particular theory of free
exercise should be considered legitimate or illegitimate. At an even
deeper level, it is also implicitly to question why we have a Free
Exercise Clause at all. If, as the formalism of Smith suggests, we
inhabit a constitutional world in which the meaning of that clause
can no longer be taken for granted, then we must ask, essentially de
novo, why it is that the free exercise of religion should ever stand
157
in unique, let alone superior, relation to the state.
A. Thinking About Free Exercise: General Considerations
Broadly speaking, religious liberty may warrant protection both
from the government and by the government for any number or
combination of reasons: social utility,15 political pragmatism,1 59
157 In this regard, the nature of my inquiry is drastically different from the textbound formalism of commentators, such asJohn Harrison, who make absolutely no
attempt to ascertain the possible animating values of the Free Exercise Clause. See,
e.g.,John Harrison, The Free Exercise Clause as a Rule About Rules, 15 HARv.J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 169, 169-70 (1992) (proposing that the sole function of the clause is to preclude
legislators, and apparently only legislators, from enacting laws specifically aimed at
prohibiting free exercise).
15 See, e.g., Smith, Special Place, supra note 12, at 102-03 (describing instances
where the Court has observed that freedom of religion produces social benefits
because of the community ties established and strengthened through religious
participation, and by bearing burdens that would otherwise have to be met by general
taxation).
159 See, e.g., David Little, The Reformed Tradition and the FirstAmendment, in THE
FIRsT FREEDOM: RELIGION AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 17, 17 (James E. Wood, Jr. ed.,
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economic theory, 160 liberal political theory,16 ' republican political theory, 162 theological doctrine, 16 social contract, 164 or as

1990) (asserting that "present-day commitments owe very little to a principled belief
in religious liberty" evidenced by our predecessors, and that, historically, "[m]uch
more is owed to the effects of pragmatic compromise and mutual convenience")
(citing QUENTIN SKINNER, THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN POLITICAL THOUGHT
(1978)); Smith, Rise and Fall, supra note 12, at 199-202 (arguing that "religion is
essential to our republic because it helps to inculcate in citizens the moral character
necessary for a democratic society").
'" See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to
Issues of Religious Freedom, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 1 (1989) (proposing the use of "an
economic definition of 'neutrality' to determine when government action impinges
impermissibly on religious choice").
161See, e.g., JAY NEWMAN, ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 135 (1991) (stating that "most
instances of political interference in the religious affairs of individuals and groups
trouble my conscience and strike me, on the basis of my own utilitarian calculations,
as being contributory in the 'long run' to a diminution of 'general happiness'");
Merel, supra note 127, at 811 (noting that the Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses of the Constitution demonstrate that an "individual is freed from both the
weight of government opinion and the oppressive effects of government regulation
in order to believe or disbelieve as he chooses"); Miller, supra note 66, at 87 (arguing
that the risk of anarchy is the necessary price of religious liberty, and the risk of
anarchy in that sense is preferable to the risk of tyranny inherent in restrictions on
liberty); Smith, Rise and Fall, supra note 12, at 202-04 (describing the personal
autonomy rationale for religious freedom, which states that religious liberty is
important to a person's sense of self or of who she is and what she wants to be); Mark
Tushnet, The Constitution ofReligion, 18 CONN. L. REV. 701,730-35 (1986) (describing
the historical and philosophical circumstances that shaped liberal political theory, and
that have reduced the significance of religion in public life).
162 See, e.g., Timothy L. Hall, Religion and Civic Virtue: A Justwfication of Free
Exercise, 67 TUL. L. REV. 87, 90 (1992) (attempting to "construct a theory of free
exercise from the insights of civic republicanism"); William L. Miller, The Moral Project
of the American Founders, in ARTICLES OF FAITH, supra note 36, at 18 (asserting that
"Americans resisted monofounderism ... as they did monarchy, on republican
principle"); Tushnet, supra note 161, at 735-38 (discussing the possibility of using the
tradition of civic republicanism as a basis for interpreting the religion clauses).
16s See, e.g.,John Coventry, The Theology of Religious Freedom, 80/81 LAW &JUST.
100, 104 (1984) (stating that the doctrine of religious freedom is ultimately a doctrine
about the irresistible freedom of God); Robert GordisJudaismand Religious Liberty,
in RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN THE CROSSFIRE OF CREEDS 25, 26 (Franklin H. Littell ed.,
1978) (asserting three aspects of religious liberty: the right to practice a faith without
interference from others, the extension of freedom of conscience by one group to
another that differs in belief and practice, and the granting of freedom of thought
and action by a group to dissidents in its own ranks); Winthrop S. Hudson, The
TheologicalBasisforReligiousFreedom,3J. CHURCH & ST. 130, 136 (1961) (arguing that
there are theologicaljustifications for the religious freedom enjoyed by U.S. citizens);
Littell, supra note 41, at 145 (noting that religious liberty rests on an understanding
of obedience to the will of God, which is voluntary service to fellow man); Mohamed
Talbi, Religious Liberty: A Muslim Perspective, in RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND HUMAN
RIGHTS IN NATIONS AND IN RELIGIONS 175, 175-87 (Leonard Swidler ed., 1986)
(demonstrating that Muslim theology supports the maintenance of religious freedom).
' See, e.g., Abner S. Greene, The PoliticalBalance of the Religion Clauses, 102 YALE
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a matter of basic morality or fairness.'6 5 Carter's theory, for
example, could fairly be described as a blend of the first two-social
utility and political pragmatism. As the earlier critique of his theory
demonstrated, however, it is not enough simply to articulate a
rationale; rather, the rationale must exhibit various characteristics
that render it appropriate in the unique context of free exercise.
These characteristics, in turn, may derive either from a particular
normative theory of religious liberty (such as those listed above) or
from an attempt to interpret or capture contemporary discourse on
the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause.' 6 This Essay, for a
variety of reasons, ventures to do the latter. 6 ' Specifically, I
propose that the following six nonexclusive, nonexhaustive criteria,
insofar as they embody our extant mainstream discourse on free
exercise, should be observed when considering the propriety of any
particular free exercise rationale. 168 First, a free exercise rationale
LJ. 1611, 1634 (1993) (arguing that free exercise of religion should be interpreted
pursuant to a readingof the religion clauses as embodying a contractual theory of law
and politics); cf. THE WILLIAMSBURG CHARTER (1988), reprintedin ARTICLEs OF FAITH,
supra note 36, app. at 123 (drafted by representatives of the leading faiths in America
to address the dilemmas, challenges, and opportunities posed by religious liberty in
American public life).
165 See, e.g., NEWMAN, supra note 161, at 135-37 (examining tie position that
religious liberty isjustifiable either as an application of the "golden rule"--that one's
moral treatment of others should stem from one's desired treatment by others-or as
an application of the principle that one should not engage in conduct that might
seem negligible if isolated, but would undermine the social order if its practice were
to become universal);J. Morris Clark, Guidelinesfor the Free Exercise Clause, 83 HARv.
L. REV. 327,337 (1969) (stating that "[a] far more important interest protected by the
free exercise clause relates to fairness to the individual").
166The notion of developing a theory based on the interpretation of legal
discourse is strongly associated with the work of Ronald Dworkin. See generally
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986).
167 These reasons are basically three-fold. First, the careful exposition of a distinct
normative theory is simply beyond the scope of this Essay. Second, such an
exposition would doubtless divide readers along normative lines; in contrast, an
interpretive restatement of existing, albeit implicit, criteria should be significantly less
controversial for most readers. Third, a primary value in presenting criteria in the
first place is heuristic, and not normative as such. It is, as the following paragraphs
show, to expose more systematically the shortcomings of various current free exercise
rationales and to underscore the dangers of interpreting the Free Exercise Clause
through the lens of only one rationale.
11 Needless to say, the validity of these six criteria hinges in part on how
accurately they represent the underlying assumptions or values of the prevailing
discourse on the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause. As I see it, most of these
assumptions or values concern liberal democratic principles, such as the importance
of individual autonomy (for example, criterion one), an aspirational commitment to
government neutrality (for example, criterion four and perhaps five), and a
commitment to the related concepts of due process, the rule of law, and rationality
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should be capable of according sustained protection to a broad
range of religious practices. 169 Second, in some way it should
account for the uniqueness of free exercise as a form of human
activity or as a type of constitutional liberty.17 Third, it should be
grounded in one or more sources of constitutional legitimationtext, tradition, underlying or derivative principles, and so forth.'7 1
Fourth, to the extent possible it should not undermine our
rhetorical, if not our actual, commitment to liberal democratic
principles, and in particular should avoid overtly embracing one
vision of the good at the expense of all others.' 72 Fifth, it should

(for example, criteria two, three, and six). To the extent, however, that these
principles do not characterize the prevailing discourse, either in part or in whole,
then one may justifiably discount their heuristic or persuasive value.
"6Lest this first rationale seem too obvious, it is a characteristic that, in effect if
not in design, is patently absent from the Court's prevailing free exercise analysis.
See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,878-79 (1990) (holding that the Free
Exercise Clause permits a state to prohibit sacramental peyote use and thus deny
unemployment benefits to persons charged with such use); Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 441-43 (1988) (holding that the Free
Exercise Clause does not prohibit the state from developing federal land in a way that
would conflict with American Indian rituals); O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S.
342, 345 (1987) (holding that prison regulations that prevented Islamic prisoners
from attending weekly services were not violative of the prisoner's right under the
Free Exercise Clause); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 695-98 (1986) (holding that a state
statute requiring welfare recipients to furnish social security numbers for all family
members receiving benefits did not violate the Free Exercise Clause although the
identification would allegedly rob the petitioner's daughter of her spiritual uniqueness
in contravention of Native American beliefs); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503,
504 (1986) (holding, due to the military's superseding interest in dress uniformity,
that an Air Force regulation that disallowed the petitioner, an ordained rabbi, from
wearing a yarmulke while on duty and in uniform did not violate the First Amendment); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 254 (1982) (holding that the Free Exercise
Clause does not prohibit "forced payment of social security taxes when payment of
taxes and receipt of benefits violate the taxpayer's religion," in this case a member of
the Old Order Amish). In every one of these cases, the free exercise claim was flatly
rejected, even though these cases involved a diversity of religious claims (some of
which were hardly unorthodox) and even though the Court admitted in at least one
case that the governmental action might have "devastating effects" on the claimants'
traditional religious practices. See Lyng, 485 U.S. at 451 (stating the Court's refusal
to measure the effects of governmental action by its effects on a "religious objector's
spiritual development").
"7 See Smith, Rise and Fall, supra note 12, at 198-99 (asserting a "distinctiveness
requirement" that "explains why religion deserves a level of legal protection that most
other human interest and activities do not receive").
171See generally Stephen Pepper, ConflictingParadigmsof Religious Freedom: Liberty
Versus Equality, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REv. 7, 11-46.
172 Neutrality, as illustrated earlier, may be an impossible absolute, but certainly
some constitutional paradigms are relatively more or less neutral than others.
Everything else being equal, I believe it is important that government should adopt
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not adversely alter our existing legal and cultural regimes-for
example, by controverting other constitutional provisions, by
affecting the viability of other constitutional rights, or by creating
undesirable cultural conceptions. Sixth and finally, it should be
capable of practical implementation, providing reasonable guidance
to citizens and the state alike, and should include a set of defensible
limits on its operation.
For the purpose of illustration, let us apply these six criteria to
assess three very different approaches to religious liberty-Carter's
instrumentalist model, the prevailing philosophical approach of
liberalism, and the prevailing doctrinal framework as stated in the
Smith decision. 17 3 Let us turn first to Carter's model of free
exercise as presented and critiqued earlier in the Essay. By using
these criteria it should become even more obvious why Carter's
instrumentalist theory, particularly when applied alone, falls short
in its protection of free exercise. As we have seen, the social utility
basis of Carter's theory logically would not protect a broad range of
religious practices (criterion one), although for the same reason it
may provide reasonable guidance on its scope of operation
(criterion six). Likewise, while the instrumentalist model exhibits
constitutional grounding (criterion three) and does not substantially
conflict with liberal democratic principles (criterion four), it does
not necessarily account for the uniqueness of religious free exercise
(criterion two). Finally, as demonstrated above, Carter's model
most certainly has the potential to produce adverse cultural
consequences (criterion five).
Of course, the failure of any
particular rationale to satisfy all six criteria does not, for that reason
alone, render the rationale illegitimate. But it does suggest that it
may be inappropriate and at the very least indicates that it must be
supplemented with additional rationales.
Let us further apply these criteria to contemporary liberalismthe prevailing philosophical approach to religious liberty. I call it
the "prevailing" approach because, by and large, the principal
philosophical framework of free exercise for the last several decades
has been one comprised of various liberal conceptions-a conception
of the self "as free and independent, unencumbered by aims and

interpretive frameworks that maximize inclusivity and minimize the perception, if not
the reality, that the world-views of certain communities or individuals are not relevant
to the contemporary meaning of the religion clauses.
"73See supra note 11 and accompanying text; supra text accompanying notes 120-
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attachments it does not choose for itself"; 174 a conception of the
state as thus necessarily "neutral on the question of the good

life"; 175 and a conception of religious faith and membership as
matters of voluntary association and commitment.176 However, as
Michael Sandel observes:

"the image of the unencumbered self,

despite its appeal, is inadequate to the liberty it promises. In the
case of religion, the liberal conception of the person ill equips the

Court to secure religious liberty for those who regard themselves as
claimed by religious commitments they have not chosen."177 In
other words, although the contemporary liberalism model would
seem to further at least our rhetorical commitment to neutrality

(criterion four), although it appears to have constitutional grounding (criterion three), and although is generally capable of implementation (criterion six), it does not guarantee the broadest of protection (criterion one), and it certainly does not treat religious
commitment as unique (criterion two). Additionally, contemporary
liberalism is potentially the source of adverse constitutional or
cultural consequences (criterion five), as Carter's book and the
earlier critiques of neutrality demonstrate.' 7 In short, while the
liberal model "seems to secure for religious liberty a firm founda-

174 MichaelJ. Sandel, Freedom of Conscience or Freedom of Choice?, in ARTICLES OF

FAITH,
supra note 36, at 75.
175
Id. See generally BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE
(1980) (discussing neutrality and liberal arguments connecting equality with the good
life); Ronald Dworkin, Liberalism, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALITY 113, 127 (Stuart
Hampshire ed., 1978) (arguing that liberalism takes, as its constitutive political
morality, the conception of equality that "government must be neutral on what might
be called the question of the good life").
171 See generally Sandel, supra note 174, at 74 (discussing "the political theory of
contemporary liberalism" and describing "its stance towards religious practice and
belief").
'7 Id. at 87. See generally Note, Reinterpretingthe Religion Clauses: Constitutional
Constructionand Conceptions of the Self, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1468,1468 (1984) (proposing
.an alternative to the liberal conception of human identity, one that encompasses
both the separateness of the self and its connection to others").
178 Sandel apparently does not go far enough in his critique of the liberal vision
of individual religiosity, for even a model that protected the involuntary aspects of
religious faith (which are only partly extrinsic to the individual) would nevertheless,
and unjustifiably, exclude the nonvolitional aspects (which are entirely extrinsic). See
Garvey, supra note 153, at 791-92 (noting that an autonomy-based understanding of
free exercise may be disagreeable to many religious claimants who see themselves as
being "chosen" by God, not the other way around); Williams & Williams, supra note
65, at 771-72 (analyzing nonvolitional religious traditions, in which individuals
perceive many of their beliefs or practices as not being the product of rational and
free choices as such).
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tion,"'7 9 like Carter's model, it invariably falls short when it
confronts a free exercise claim that logically and conceptually
deviates from its premises.
Third and finally, let us apply these six criteria to the free
exercise analysis articulated in the Supreme Court's Employment
Division v. Smith... decision. Under that analysis, the Sherbert-Yoder

compelling interest standard 1 ' is activated only where a law or
other governmental action is targeted specifically at religion, such
that the action is neither neutral nor generally applicable, or where
the religious claim happens to be of a certain kind, such as
unemployment compensation."' Turning to the six criteria, this
approach may have constitutional grounding (criterion three), at
least purports to further the ideal of neutrality (criterion five), and
most of all is easily administered (criterion six). However, the
protection it provides is far from broad (criterion one), it takes
absolutely no account of the uniqueness of religion (criterion two),
and it can indeed produce adverse constitutional and cultural
consequences (criterion five) insofar as it sends the message that
religious practices are both inconsequential and largely subordinate
to the needs of the state.
If the inadequacy of each of these approaches reveals anything,
it is the unlikelihood that any one rationale will ever prove
sufficient-and perhaps that theories that see the Free Exercise
Clause as a one-rationale provision are significantly misguided.
Indeed, as the mere variety of available rationales, the range of
these legitimating criteria, and the religious pluralism of America
suggest, there is no particular reason to seek one overarching
rationale to the effective exclusion of others. To the contrary, it
seems perfectly reasonable to propose that several rationales may
simultaneously coexist and thus coanimate the vitality of the
clause.183 To some, of course, this proposition may seem slightly

'

Sandel, supra note 174, at 86.

494 U.S. 872 (1989).

See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963); supra notes 115-22 and accompanying text.
112 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 873.
"s Cf. Garvey, supra note 153, at 794 ("It may be a mistake for lawyers to assume,
like physicists who seek to unify the four forces, that there is only one ultimate
principle supporting constitutional freedoms. There may instead be a cluster of
1

values . . . ."). Within the same clause, however, a multiplicity of rationales raises

concerns about all three aspects of the rule of law-notice, treating similarly-situated
parties similarly, and limited governmental discretion-to the extent that judges,
lawyers, and citizens are unable to discern which rationale should govern in situations

1366 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 142:1313
heterodox, particularly given the seductive dogma of contemporary
constitutional theory that we should seek the single "mega-rationale"
184
that can at once explain and justify one or several areas of law.
By its very nature, however, the Free Exercise Clause is a multidimensional provision, for it attempts to reconcile contemporaneously
the many needs of religious liberty with the many needs of our
constitutional order.
In the end, we must move beyond unidimensionality and the
relegation of free exercise to a culture of disbelief-beyond the
confining effects of instrumentalism or liberal individualism, and
certainly beyond the hollowness of Smith-to a richer, more
expansive understanding of religious belief and practice.
B. Rediscovering the Intrinsic Worth of Free Exercise
In this final Section, I propose the rediscovery of "intrinsic
worth" as a means to conceptualize religious free exercise.
Although this conception should not be understood as the exclusive
means to interpret the Free Exercise Clause (since the error of
unidimensionality would then be committed), it is nevertheless
essential to a full understanding of the meaning of that clause, both
in terms of explaining its reason for being and in terms ofjustifying
the broad protection offered through the Sherbert-Yoder standard.
In particular, an intrinsic worth theory offers two primary advantages, one conceptual and the other practical, over many of the existing
theories. First, at a conceptual level, the theory logically permits
one to value religion in a unique and meaningful way, an attribute
that is seemingly obvious but which, as illustrated above, is typically
absent from prevailing approaches. 185 Second, as a practical

where different rationales are equally applicable but would produce different
outcomes.
184The search for overarching rationales has been a hallmark of modern
constitutional theory, especially in the context of the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Daniel A. Farber, Legal
Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1331, 1334 (1988) ("Foundationalism has been the prevailing style of recent constitutional scholarship. Scholars have
proposed various theories of judicial review in the effort to discover a unified
principle that would provide the basis for judicial decisions."). However, "[a]s the
arguments over constitutional theory enter the last few years of the twentieth century,
theorists increasingly debate the consequences of their demonstrations of the failures
and limitations of 'grand' or 'unitary' theories designed to restrict constitutional
interpretation to a single overarching, unifying principle." MICHAELJ. GERHARDT &
THOMAS D. ROWE, JR., CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: ARGUMENTS AND PERSPECTIVES 13

(1993).

" See generally Smith, Rise and Fall, supra note 12, at 149 (arguing that "our
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matter, such a theory can rationally explain both why the government should bear the burden of persuasion when it seeks to
interfere with free exercise and why that burden, once allocated,
should be substantial.
1. The Nature and Foundations of an Intrinsic
Worth Rationale
In the context of religious liberty, "intrinsic worth" encompasses
the notion that free exercise is an inherently and uniquely valuable
undertaking, and that the protection of free exercise should arise
from a recognition of this fact. At its core, intrinsic worth rests on
the possibility that there is meaning to be found beyond the
profanity of our day-to-day, hand-to-mouth existence-within realms
we might call the spiritual, or the supernatural, or the sacred-and
on the ultimate or transformative significance that this possibility
holds for our lives as individuals and as communities. 8 6 Thus
formulated, the intrinsic worth concept is at once both strikingly
simple and yet profoundly complex, for it implicates certain
understandings about the nature of human beings, including their
constitutional commitment to religious freedom contains a fatal internal flaw" in that
"it cancels itself out by precluding government from recognizing and acting upon the
principal justification supporting that commitment").
156For a classic disquisition on the nature and importance of the sacred in human
history, see generally MIRCEA ELIADE, THE SACRED AND THE PROFANE: THE NATURE

OF RELIGION (Willard R. Trask trans., Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. 1959) (1957).
Importantly, my purpose at this point is not to argue anew the independent merits
of an intrinsic worth conception of free exercise; for the most part, its theoretical
legitimacy and historical grounding are taken for granted. Those interested in
pursuing further these foundational issues should see generally ARLIN M. ADAMS &
CHARLEsJ. EMMERICH, A NATION DEDICATED TO RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL HERITAGE OF THE RELIGION CLAusES 37-40 (1990) (discussing historical

precedent for "liberty of conscience" along with the Madisonian assertion that
"[c]onscience is the most sacred of all property"); W. Cole Durham, Jr., Religious
Liberty and the Call of Conscience, 42 DEPAUL L. REv. 71, 80-84 (1992) (discussing
historical precedent for religious liberty and focusing particularly on the Madisonian
view of religious liberty and the need for a "jurisdictional division between religion
and government"); Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding
of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1513-17 (1990) (arguing that the
debate over whether the Free Exercise Clause requires the granting of religious
exemptions from generally applicable laws with secular purposes has proceeded in a
historical fashion and concluding that an interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause
that mandates religious exemptions was both within the contemplation of the
Framers, and consonant with popular notions of religious liberty and limited
government that existed at the time of the framing); Smith, Rise and Fall,supra note
12, at 154-66 (providing a historical discussion of religiousjustification for the special
protection of religious freedom in our constitution).
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latent metaphysical potential, and takes seriously the possibility of
human relationships with realms or beings beyond the material
world. With these broad points in mind, let us now consider more
closely the foundations of such a concept as well as its expression
within the particular context of the First Amendment.
Just as religious liberty can itself be rooted in any number of
justifications, the intrinsic worth of free exercise can also be derived

from a variety of sources or framed in a variety of ways-natural
rights, theologically based ethics,"s7 international human
rights, 8 ' or by analogy from other realms, such as environmental
or animal ethics,'8 9 in which intrinsic worth has become a visibly
important paradigm. The classic formulation, however, can still be
found in Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance, in which religious
liberty is framed as an inalienable right:
[W]e hold it for a fundamental and undeniable truth, "that
Religion or the duty which we owe to our Creator and the manner

of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction,
not by force or violence." The Religion then of every man must
be left to the conviction and conscience of every man; and it is the
right of every man to exercise it as these may dictate. This right
is in its nature an unalienable right.'
A more modern, more expansive constitutional formulation of the
right might be Professor Kauper's:
187 See, e.g., RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: AN END AND A BEGINNING (John C. Murray ed.,
1966) (focusing on a Catholic understanding of religious liberty and the 1965
Declaration on Religious Freedom).

" See, e.g., Declaration of the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of
DiscriminationBased on Religion or Belief (1981), reprinted in RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND
HUMAN RIGHTS IN NATIONS AND IN RELIGIONS, supra note 163, app. at 248; Universal
Declarationof Human Rights art. 18 (1948), quoted in NEWMAN, supra note 161, at 12425 ("'Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right
includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in
teaching, practice, worship and observance.'").
'89 See, e.g., PAUL EHRLICH & ANNE EHRLICH, EXTINCTION: THE CAUSES AND
CONSEQUENCES OF THE DISAPPEARANCE OF SPECIES 48-52 (1981) (proposing an
inherent "right to exist"); PAUL W. TAYLOR, RESPECT FOR NATURE: A THEORY OF
ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS (1986) (proposing a "biocentric" approach to environmental
ethics).
1
9JAMES MADISON, Memorial and RemonstranceAgainst Religious Assessments, in 8
THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 299 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1973) (quoting
VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS OF 1776, art. XVI). See generallyJAMES MADISON
ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (Robert S. Alley ed., 1985). For a discussion of the central
place of this formulation in the founding period, see Smith, Rise and Fall,supra note
12, at 156-66.
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The Constitution... does not create religious liberty....
[R]eligious freedom is deemed to be not a concession or grant by
the state but an indefeasible right of the person, which the government must recognize, respect and protect. Religious liberty is not
to be confused with religious tolerance. Tolerance as a legal
concept is premised on the assumption that the state has ultimate
control over religion and the churches, and that whether and to
what extent religious freedom will be granted and protected is a
matter of state policy. Tolerance of minority religious groups and
of nonconformists was an important half-way step in the struggle
for religious liberty as evidenced in American colonial history.
But our constitutional system embodies the full-blown concept of
religious freedom as a natural right which limits the government,
rather than a privilege dispensed by governmental authority in
pursuing a policy of benevolent toleration.'91
The critical element in these formulations-basically ignored by
the Smith Court-is the priority of religious liberty relative to
government, both in terms of being independent of and antecedent
to the state and in terms of being superior to (almost all of) the
claims of the state. 9 2 Government exists not to serve its own ends
at the expense of religious liberty; rather, all but its most central
needs are recognized as subordinate to the religious claims of
citizens. 9 ' Moreover, while political or social utility may derive
incidentally from a robust religious liberty, any such utility is
understood to be neither the basis for nor the measure of that
liberty. As one commentator notes, "[e]very discussion of religious
liberty which begins with the political objective ends in confusion.
The political benefits of religious liberty, and they are very great,
are derivative .... ,1.4
191Paul G. Kauper, Legal Aspects of Religious Liberty, in RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra

note 88, at 25; see also id. at 29 ("Religion... centers in a relationship to a divine
being or force which is over and beyond human relationships and by its nature
withdrawn from the sphere of civic control or intrusion. This relationship gives
religion a special dimension. The constitutional protection accorded religious liberty
is a recognition of this relationship."); Forell, supra note 88, at 5.
" The priority claim could also mean that religious goods "are more valuable or
more important than most or perhaps all other human goods." Smith, Rise and Fall,
supra note 12, at 154.
's Cf Douglas Sturm, Repentance Constitutionalism, and Sacrality, 42 DEPAuL L.

REV. 61,67 (1992) ("[G]overnment is subordinate to the higher reaches of the human
spirit and must accommodate those higher reaches. Religious liberty and its
corollary, religious tolerance, are not a privilege granted by political authority...
11 Littell, supra note 41, at 137.
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In light of this understanding, we can further see the problems
inherent both in instrumentalist views of religious liberty and in the
Smith decision, each of which effectively elevates government above
the free exercise needs of its citizens and thus ignores the secondary
role of government in the larger scheme of human good. Indeed,
Smith's distinction between discriminatory laws and generally
applicable or neutral laws is largely nonsensical to the extent that
the priority claim of religious liberty is taken seriously. In a recent
critique of Smith, Justice Souter had the cognizance and conviction

to point out that:
[t]he extent to which the Free Exercise Clause requires government to refrain from impeding religious exercise defines nothing
less than the respective relationships in our constitutional
democracy of the individual to government and to God. "Neutral,
generally applicable" laws, drafted as they are from the perspective
of the non-adherent, have the unavoidable potential of putting the
believer to a choice between God and government.1 95
What is most disturbing today-Justice Souter notwithstandingis the almost total lack of reference to this conception of religious
liberty by those, such as Supreme CourtJustices, who regularly pass
judgment on the free exercise rights of religious citizens." 6 To
some extent, of course, this state of affairs is traceable to the kinds
of phenomena that prompt Carter to conclude that a culture of
disbelief exists-trivialization, privatization, false neutrality, and
secularization.19 7 Likewise, this status quo may also be the reductiothe "self-cancellation"-of an understanding of religious freedom
that prohibits governmental reliance on religious doctrine, since the
intrinsic worth rationale seems unavoidably to have a religious
dimension.198 And certainly we must consider the collective

"9Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217,
2250 (1993) (Souter,J., concurring).
196 See Smith, Rise and Fall, supra note 12, at 167-68; Smith, Special Place, supra
note 12, at 116-17. Prior to justice Souter, in fact, onlyJustice William 0. Douglas
had been so explicit. See id. at 104-05, 117 (discussingJustice Douglas as having given
a "religious justification for the special constitutional place of individual religion").
Whether or not the newest member of the Court,Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, will
join justice Souter in this conception of religious liberty is not known at this point.
As a court of appealsjudgeJustice Ginsburg took a relatively strong position in favor

of free exercise but declined to articulate her theoretical basis for doing so. See
Goldman v. Secretary of Defense, 739 F.2d 657, 660 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Ginsburg,J.,
dissenting), aff'd, 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
19"
See Smith, Rise and Fall,supra note 12, at 168-78 (discussing the influence of
secularization and privatization in recent decades).

198 See id. at 180-96 (discussing the impact of the constitutional prohibition of
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impact of the pervasiveness of the modem welfare state coupled
with a variety of demographic changes and pressures. In particular,
as the size and demands of the population and the state have
increased, it has apparently become no easier, and perhaps more
difficult, to justify the individual deviations engendered by religious
belief-whether they be the use of controlled substances such a
peyote, 199 the preservation of sacred lands, 200 or the avoidance
of full participation in taxation or social security schemes.20 1 At
the same time, it has become less and less difficult to conceptualize
religion in instrumentalist terms.2 2 Religion is seen as something
that appears to be exacting demands from the state-rather than
something burdened by the state-and that therefore must be
justified according to the utility that it produces. 2 3 Needless to
"governmental reliance upon religious doctrines or beliefs").
199See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 452
(1988).
201See Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 701 (1986); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252,
261 (1982). I should offer two qualifications about using these cases, as well as Smith
and Lyng, to support my rather broad allegation in the text. First, I am not
suggesting that state-sanctioned intolerance for nonmainstream religious claims is
somehow a new phenomenon. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878)
(approving of the criminalization of polygamy despite its centrality as a Mormon
practice); see also Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890) (same). What differentiates the
modern cases from their nineteenth century counterparts, however, is that they are
all to some degree incongruent with the legal and cultural expansion of individual
liberty that has transpired over the intervening years, particularly in the last three to
four decades. See generally Glendon & Yanes, supra note 156, at 477-78, 492-518
(noting the disparity between the treatment of religion-related rights and the
treatment of other rights). Second, these cases are by no means homogeneous, and
it would be a mistake to assume that each of them supports my textual allegation in
the same manner or to the same extent. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 71, at 220-22
(differentiating between allowing "religious opt-out" from the welfare state's
regulatory programs and religious opt-out from its redistributive programs).
Nevertheless, while such distinctions may be useful at a conceptual level, they do not
undermine the more general point that the welfare state, with its rich array of sub
rosa ethical presuppositions concealed beneath a veneer of neutrality, poses an
increasingly serious threat to nonmainstream, if not mainstream, religious claims.
' The displacement ofindividual rights-based conceptions of law by instrumentalist conceptions is not an unprecedented pattern in American legal development. See,
e.g., MORTONJ. HoRWrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960: THE
CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 112 (1992) ("As law [in the nineteenth century] became
increasingly implicated in the process of promoting economic growth, the earlier
natural rights justifications for the judicial function [that is, to vindicate individual
natural rights] began to be overwhelmed by the overtly instrumental use of private
law to advance utilitarian objectives.").
21' Indeed, the common use of the term "claim" or "claimant" to describe the free
exercise interest at stake lends rhetorical support to the idea that it is the govern-
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say, this government-centered view amounts to a perversion of the
free exercise ideal and turns the priority claim of religious liberty
completely on its head. Various liberties, for various reasons, were
removed from the often careless, if not self-serving political
processes, and religious free exercise is one such liberty-removed
for the very reason that it is intrinsically good and largely beyond
the competence of the state to evaluate and, in turn, to regulate.
Like Carter, therefore, I see no other way to have religion taken
seriously unless a scheme similar to the Sherbert-Yoder compelling
interest standard is imposed upon governmental actions when they
interfere with the religious free exercise of citizens. Unlike Carter's
model, however, the intrinsic worth model would genuinely
recognize the serious interests at stake from the claimant's point of
view. Rather than create a balance between one state interest (the
need to maintain religious autonomy insofar as it serves democratic
ends) and another (whatever reason the state may have for interfering with free exercise), an intrinsic worth-based scheme would
create a balance between that latter state interest and the very
different interest inherent in free exercise, an interest theoretically
unrelated to the needs of the state. At the same time, to the extent
the priority claim of religious liberty is taken seriously, the second
half of the balance would require from the state the most compelling of interests if the governmental action is to override the free
exercise interests of the claimant. To be sure, the intrinsic worth
model is one of the few satisfying ways to justify the standard set
forth in cases like Sherbert and Yoder.2" 4 By its own logic, the
burden must fall upon the state, the burden must in turn be significant, and it matters not whether the law in question is neutral or
generally applicable. Claimants may still lose, of course, but at least
the state would be required to overcome a burden somewhat
proportional to the gravity of its interference with their free
exercise.

ment, and not the citizen, that is somehow being burdened by the other's demands.
Likewise, Professor Douglas Laycock has noted that the term "accommodation" in the
context of free exercise exemptions "implies that government is going out of its way
to do religion a favor, but that usage fits only occasionally.... [M]ost of the time, we
are not talking about special favors ....
We are talking about the right to be let alone
in the exercise of religion." Douglas Laycock, Summary and Synthesis: The Crisis in

Religious Liberty, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 841, 846 (1992).
204 Cf Smith, Rise and Fall, supra note 12, at 149 (arguing that "the religious
justification is also the most satisfying, and perhaps the only adequatejustification for
a special constitutional commitment to religious liberty").
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2. Potential Shortcomings of an Intrinsic Worth Rationale
In addition to emphasizing these advantages, it is only proper to
address the possible shortcomings of using an intrinsic worth theory
of free exercise. All models, of course, contain shortcomings above
and beyond the opportunity costs they incur. As we have seen,
utility-based free exercise rationales present the problem of
premature finiteness, while liberal individualist rationales are
problematic to the extent that they deny certain dimensions of
human religiosity. When we consider the intrinsic worth model,
three potential problems come to mind: an inability to draw lines,
the potential for violating either the Establishment Clause or our
commitment to governmental neutrality, and theoretical impossibility.
First, it might seem that by trading utility for intrinsic worth, we
have merely traded underinclusiveness for overinclusiveness. That
is, instead of failing to encompass-and thus accord protection tovarious beliefs or practices that do not meet the chosen instrumental rationale, we simply lose the ability to draw any lines at all.
Indeed, is it even possible to discern logically coherent limits on an
"intrinsic good," particularly one as abstract as the free exercise of
religion? To the extent it is not, moreover, would the intrinsic
worth model not then run afoul of the sixth criterion, that of
administrability and finitude? Of course, if we were to take the
intrinsic worth of free exercise too seriously-as if nothing temporal
could override it-then line-drawing would no doubt be either
arbitrary or futile. To take the intrinsic worth of free exercise
seriously, however, is not to say that it cannot or should not have
limits, or that its limits cannot reflect legitimate governmental
concerns. After all, being ultimately bounded by the needs of the
state or the public (that is, by social needs) is not the same as being
initially justified by social utility, and I see nothing inherently
problematic with using the former type of social consideration. In
defining these limits, moreover, I also see nothing inherently
problematic in using several of the criteria already employed by the
courts to limit the scope of free exercise protection. First and
foremost, the use of a compelling interest standard necessarily
creates limits at those points where the government's interests
become compelling. Second, to the extent we can agree upon a
legal definition of religion, we also create limits by excluding those
beliefs and practices that fall outside the definition. Third, allowing
the trier-of-fact to evaluate a claimant's sincerity of belief, though
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admittedly a risky undertaking, places limits on the ability of
claimants to appropriate fraudulently the special status of free exercise. 2 5 Lastly, the use of a centrality standard-which would ask
how central or important the religious practice is to the claimant's
belief system-creates one more source of line-drawing, although like
sincerity, it is not an undertaking free from difficulty. 2 6 Even
with the use of these limiting factors, of course, line-drawing may
still prove difficult, which is one reason the Smith Court largely
withdrew from the field. An inability to draw lines, however,
although clearly problematic, is not a strong argument against
attempting to provide vigorous free exercise protection. Perhaps it
is true that courts should not be in the business of pronouncing
entirely novel and unenumerated liberties, but neither should they
be in the business of refusing to enforce those liberties that are
reasonably embodied within the letter and the spirit of the Constitution.207 As Carter notes, "[d]eciding when to allow exemptions
would place a tremendous burden on the courts-but there is no
reason that the hard work of protecting freedom should be easy,
and, certainly, the fact that the task is difficult is no reason not to
2 s
undertake it."
Second, the use of an intrinsic worth rationale might run afoul
of our constitutional commitment to avoid religious establishments
(thus violating criterion five), since this rationale appears to have,
at least historically, an unavoidably religious dimension, and since
205 See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944) (holding that the district

court was correct in withholding from the jury all questions concerning the truth or
falsity of respondents' religious beliefs).
206 One practical concern is that members of religious denominations are
themselves frequently divided over the contours of their faith, such that centrality
may be difficult to determine. See KoNvrrz, supra note 127, at 77-79; see also Peter
L. Berger, Who's Afraid of Religious Values?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1993, § 7, at 15
(book review) (noting that Carter's similar proposal that "obviously central" religious
beliefs should merit accommodation does not explain how, or by whom, the
determination of centrality should be made).
207 As Justice Souter recently observed:

There appears to be a strong argument from the [Free Exercise] Clause's
development in the First Congress, from its origins in the post-Revolution
state constitutions and pre-Revolution colonial charters, and from the
philosophy of rights to which the Framers adhered, that the Clause was
originally understood to preserve a right to engage in activities necessary to
fulfill one's duties to one's God, unless those activities threatened the rights
of others or the serious needs of the state.
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2249
(1993) (SouterJ., concurring).
208p. 144.
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the judiciary can itself be a source of impermissible establishment. 20 9 Likewise, at a more theoretical level, the use of such a

rationale might appear to offend a liberal conception of the state,
thus also running afoul of criterion four. The constitutional
problem, simply stated, is that a governmental recognition of this
understanding of free exercise, insofar as it has roots in Protestant
Christian theology and seems to embrace certain religious understandings about human spirituality, might plausibly be suspect
under the Establishment Clause.210 Such a recognition may be
constitutionally infirm to the extent that it is found to lack a secular
to constitute an excessive entanglement of religion
purpose,
and government, 21 2 to amount to religious preferentialism, 213 to
constitute an endorsement of religion, 214 or to be the product of
religious motivation.

215

The extension of these nonestablishment principles so freely and
formalistically into the free exercise context, however, would be a
serious mistake. Precisely because of its uniquely important subject
29

o See North Carolina Civil Liberties Union Legal Fund v. Constangy, 947 F.2d
1145 (4th Cir. 1991) (invalidating a state judge's use of a courtroom prayer), cert.
denied,
112 S. Ct. 3027 (1992).
2,0 See Sandel, supra note 174, at 86; cf. Smith, Rise and Fall,supra note 12, at 149
("[R]eligious freedom... forbids governmental reliance upon religiousjustifications
as a basis for public policies or decisions. Therein lies the paradox-our constitutional
commitment to religious freedom undermines its own foundation; it cancels itself out
by precluding government from recognizing and acting upon the principal
justification supporting that commitment."). Carter, for one, would likely perceive
no establishment issue, since he rejects the motivation and endorsement inquiries-or
at least would probably not consider this to be "the government ... placing its
imprimatur on a symbol of a particular religion," p. 94-and since this kind of
governmental recognition would presumably further religious autonomy.
211 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (stating that "a statute must
have a secular legislative purpose").
212 See id. at 613 (stating that a "statute must not foster 'an excessive governmental
entanglement with religion'" (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674
(1970))).
213 See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982) (stating that "[tihe clearest
command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be
officially preferred over another").
214See County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573,
593 (1989) (stating that "the prohibition against governmental endorsements of
religion 'preclude[s] government from conveying or attempting to convey a message
that religion or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred'" (quoting Wallace
v.Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (1985) (O'Connor,J., concurring))).
215 See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 594 (1987) (holding that "because the
primary purpose of [Louisiana's] Creationism Act [was] to endorse a particular
religious doctrine, the Act furtherted] religion in violation of the Establishment
Clause").
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matter, the Free Exercise Clause should not be understood as simply
another law or governmental action, but rather as a special
constitutional provision that must remain peculiarly unencumbered
if it is to protect meaningfully the religious liberty of citizens.
Indeed, if we were to follow only the logic of these nonestablishment tests and thus ignore the uniqueness of the Free Exercise
Clause, the entire clause could very well be held invalid. After all,
it seems to constitute an endorsement of religion, is most certainly
not neutral (for it singles out religion, ostensibly for a benefit), and
was the product, at least in part, of religious motivation. Unless we
are willing to jeopardize the entire religious liberty guarantee,
therefore, the intrinsic worth rationale cannot be rejected or
avoided simply because it appears to controvert certain judicially
devised doctrines of the Establishment Clause. There may be
specific situations in which the use of the intrinsic worth rationale
would so conflict with our understanding of nonestablishment-for
example, where it is interpreted narrowly so as to protect only
certain religious practices-that the interclause conflict could no
longer be ignored and the Establishment Clause would necessarily
prevail. But in the vast majority of situations, the use of an intrinsic
worth rationale should simply be immunized from the normal
application of Establishment Clause doctrine.
Even if we successfully resist the temptation of doctrinal
formalism, however, there remains an apparent conflict between
governmental recognition of this rationale and the liberal principle
that the state should remain rhetorically if not actually neutral with
respect to matters of ultimate truth and of "the good life." At the
same time, governmental recognition of a religiously informed
rationale may seem problematic to the extent the state should be
largely if not entirely secular in both its orientation and its means.
And in neither case may we simply invoke the sui generis character
of the Free Exercise Clause (as in the preceding paragraph), for
liberal democratic principles are not necessarily beholden to
constitutional doctrine. Nevertheless, I believe these problems can
be resolved without engaging in a polemic over the underlying
normative principles of neutrality and secularism.
Specifically, I would argue that a liberal conception of the state,
including perhaps even the ideals of secularism and neutrality, need
not be interpreted to preclude governmental acknowledgement of
the unique importance of religious liberty, even though for many
citizens this importance is understood in theological terms. First,
the priority claim of religious liberty is substantially congruent with
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a liberal contractarian conception of the state as a construct erected
to "promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of
Liberty."2 1 Second, the priority claim, if taken seriously, would
maximize religious freedom to the extent feasible and would thus
advance the liberal ideal of individual autonomy (although it should
be further noted that individual autonomy is itself not the foundation of intrinsic worth2 17). There may be "pro-Christian bias," or
something akin to it, underlying the priority claim, but in contrast
to Carter's instrumentalist model, the intrinsic worth model would
incidentally err on the side of allowing greater individual freedom,
not less. Third, while a recognition of free exercise as being
intrinsically valuable is not neutral in the sense that the state takes
a stance as to the goodness and preferability of religious liberty, this
particular stance or preference has virtually always been a part of
the liberal tradition's bundle of favored rights.2"' To the extent,
moreover, that this overt preference is compatible with liberalism,
the adoption of a strong version of free exercise-one, for example,
that does not defer to generally applicable laws-may be understood
not as a means to undermine true neutrality, but rather as a means
to achieve it. For as Carter suggests, it is difficult to argue that the
ab libitum enforcement of generally applicable laws is not, as a
matter of effect and perhaps even design, actually a passing of
judgment on the truth or falsity of a citizen's beliefs or practices
that conflict with those laws. 219 Fourth, as far as the specific
formulation of the intrinsic worth rationale is concerned, the
corollary neutrality requirement that the government not adopt
specific religious world-views would appear to be satisfied insofar as
the state need only remain "agnostic" as to the existence of the
sacred, to the possibility of a relationship between the citizen and
pmbl.
217 Accordingly, the intrinsic worth-based conception should not be subjected to
216 U.S. CONST.

the criticisms that some commentators offer against an autonomy-based conception.
See, e.g., Garvey, supra note 153, at 788-92 (offering a number of objections to an
understanding of free exercise based on the value of individual autonomy).
218 This point underscores the tension within liberalism between the rhetorical
commitment to neutrality and the actual traditional commitment to protecting certain
rights as fundamental. See, e.g., PHILIP SELZNICK, THE MORAL COMMONWEALTH:
SOCIAL THEORY AND THE PROMISE OF COMMUNITY 380-81 (1992) (discussing liberal
neutralism and stating that "[t]he argument for neutrality is supported by a
distinction
between the right and the good").
219
See pp. 220-21 (arguing that the legal system's refusal to take account of the
religious belief of theJehovah's Witness-that accepting a blood transfusion will lead
to eternal damnation-is not to treat the claim as irrelevant, but as false).

1378 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 142:1313
the sacred, and to the potential importance and profundity of such
a relationship. 220 And the parallel concern for maintaining the
secular nature of government may be overstated in the context of
free exercise, since that context is one already defined by the special
treatment of religion and since a recognition of the priority claim
in that context would likely have little effect on the substantive
content of the state's other functions. Paradoxically, it may even be
the case that the more the state treats religion as special and
unique, as something entirely distinct in character from itself, the
more the secular nature of the state is emphasized or reinforced.
Finally, there should be some concern about the theoretical
impossibility of an intrinsic worth theory of free exercise. Intrinsic
worth, as many in the environmental and animal ethics realms have
noted, 22 1 is logically problematic to the extent that its evaluatorsthat is to say, we or our government officials-theoretically cannot
avoid making judgments that are in some way extrinsic to the
approach is similar to Michael McConnell's position. See McConnell, supra
note 186, at 1516 (stating that "[w]hile the government is powerless and incompetent
to determine what particular conception of the divine is authoritative, the free
exercise clause stands as a recognition that such divine authority may exist and, if it
exists, has a rightful claim on the allegiance of believers who happen to be American
citizens"). McConnell argues that
[flor the state to maintain that its authority is in all matters supreme would
be to deny the possibility that a transcendent authority could exist....
[T]he state is constitutionally disabled from disputing the truth of the
religious claim and.., it cannot categorically deny the authority on which
such a claim rests.
Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 15-24.
Steven Smith argues that such a position is logically indefensible to the extent
one proposes that governmental agnosticism in turn leads to a policy of deferring to
religious claimants. See Smith, Rise and Fall,supra note 12, at 187-93. In particular,
he sees no obvious reason to place the burden of persuasion on the state if the state
is to be truly agnostic. "[T]he logic might just as well run the other way: religious
beliefs might be false, and the state cannot pronounce them true; therefore, the state
should proceed as if those beliefs are false." Id. at 189. Within the confines of his
analysis, of course, Smith raises a good point. However, when the agnosticism version
of neutrality is viewed in conjunction with other liberal principles, such as individual
freedom and a contractual understanding of the state, Professor Smith's rebuttal
becomes substantially less compelling.
21 See generallyJames C. Anderson, Moral Planes and Intrinsic Values, 13 ENVTL.
ETHICS 49, 53-58 (1991) (discussing logical difficulties of according intrinsic moral
value to nonhumans); Robert W. Gardiner, Between Two Worlds: Humans in Nature
and Culture, 12 ENVTL. ETHICS 339, 339 (1990) (noting strong likelihood of using
human-based ethical concepts to address ethics of nature); Tom Regan, The Nature
and Possibility of an EnvironmentalEthic, 3 ENVTL. ETHICS 19, 19 (1981) (surveying
various objections to an intrinsic worth theory of environmental ethics and ultimately
questioning whether a rationally coherent theory of this type is possible).
" This
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subject. In turn, the entire concept of intrinsic worth may be
nothing more than a conceptual sham-a construct premised on
inherent value that in actual operation relies substantially on
external assessment. As a practical matter, moreover, if extrinsic
valuation is effectively the animating force of this rationale, then to
what extent can the process of using an intrinsic worth model really
be differentiated from a model such as Carter's that overtly engages
in extrinsic valuation? At the theoretical level, of course, this is a
difficult critique to counter, for it raises a host of epistemological
questions that exceed the scope of this Essay. At the practical level,
however, it is much less problematic. Once again, we must
remember that the state need only assume an agnostic posture and
that its adoption of an intrinsic worth conception of free exercise
need only require it to proceed as if religious claims might be true.
The critical element, in other words, is the relative orientation of
the decision-maker-or, in practical terms, the placement of the
burden of persuasion-and not the decision-maker's actual acceptance of religious reality or truth. Therefore, while extrinsic
judgments will no doubt seep into the analysis, perhaps even
judgments regarding social utility, the outward orientation prescribed by the intrinsic worth model-away from the state's interests
toward the potentiality of the sacred-will at least keep such
judgments to a minimum.
CONCLUSION

As this Review Essay has made evident, I disagree strongly with
Carter both as to the methodology of his empirical efforts and,
more significantly, as to the appropriate conceptual framework for
religious liberty. At the same time, however, I would hope that my
critique does not detract from the considerable remaining value of
his provocative and important book, or from the contributions that
The Culture of Disbelief will no doubt make to our contemporary
debate over the proper relationship between religion and government. Significantly, Carter's book is not simply another law-andreligion propaganda tract, written to fan the flames of that alreadyheated debate. Nor is it a treatise of clear-cut answers, as Carter
periodically concedes that some disputes appear to have no
acceptable resolution.22 2 Rather, it is a book
See, e.g., p. 155 (addressing the propriety of prohibiting certain forms of
discrimination by religious institutions that receive governmental funding, where, as
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about attitudes-the attitude that we as a political society hold
toward religion.... It is an effort to understand our instincts and
our rules and our rhetoric, to figure out why it is that religion is
seen as worse than other forces that mold people's minds, and to
try to discover whether there might be a way to preserve the
separation of church and state without trivializing faith as we do
25

today."

As for the validity of Carter's empirical claim that a culture of
disbelief exists, I have argued that the highly relative and subjective
nature of the inquiry renders any sort of objective determination
extremely difficult. Precisely because the "culture of disbelief" is
not some type of self-evident phenomenon, and because it is so
contingent on the preconceptions of each reader, any genuine
debate over its existence is doomed to stalemate. What is needed,
and what this Essay has attempted in part to provide, is a more
systematic inquiry into the treatment of religion in public life: the
definition of specific relevant phenomena, such as privatization or
secularization, as well as a clear statement regarding (and justifying)
the ways that such phenomena, if and when observed, ought to be
interpreted. Until a methodology of this type is available, it must
simply fall upon each reader to pass judgment on the validity and
meaning of Carter's proof.
The more interesting realm of Carter's book, in fact, is not the
empirical but the normative. His general theory of religion and
government, premised on the role of religions as mediating
institutions, would appear to provide one viable paradigm for
justifying and understanding religious participation in our law and
politics. There should be some concern, of course, that his model
may encourage an instrumentalist perception of religious political
participation, but such a perception is arguably an inevitable part of
the political realm and should not be problematic to the extent it
remains limited to that realm. Likewise, Carter's theory appears to
provide a reasonable interpretation of the Establishment Clause,
one that is highly significant insofar as it reemphasizes the need to
protect religion from the state no less than the state from religion.
Indeed, at a time when the state is becoming increasingly pervasive
and secular, it is important that the religious stake in the separation
of religion and government not be lost amidst concerns over

in the case of sexual orientation, there is no clear-cut social consensus as to whether
or not such discrimination is wrong).
23 p. 15.
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endorsement, effect, or coercion. But Carter necessarily falls short
when he extends his mediation theory into the realm of free
exercise, particularly at the exclusion of other free exercise concerns
and justifications. His attempt to ground the importance of free
exercise in relation to the social utility of religion, while logically
consistent with his overarching theory of religion and government,
is simply inadequate to protect the diversity of religious beliefs and
practices that exist in contemporary society. Even more serious, the
reduction of religious liberty to instrumentalist terms may bring
about an assortment of adverse cultural consequences, including
changes in the ways citizens perceive their own religious commitments and their place in our political culture.
In an ironic way, of course, Carter's theoretical shortcoming has
proven quite valuable, for it has invited serious consideration of why
free exercise should merit special constitutional treatment at all.
This Review Essay has argued that if religious free exercise is to
receive meaningful protection, at the very least it must be understood in terms of its intrinsic worth. Under such a view, religious
liberty should be protected because it encompasses the inalienable
right of each person to realize and to fulfill his or her relationship
to the sacred-independent of, and indeed prior to, the claims of the
state. This Review Essay has further argued, however, that when
interpreting the Free Exercise Clause we must avoid the temptation
to reduce its essence to a single rationale-including that of intrinsic
worth. Instead, the constitutional guarantee of free exercise must
receive its meaning and vitality from a multiplicity of rationales,
which may collectively provide the breadth of protection necessary
for the diversity of religious traditions that today exist in the United
States. Without such protection, we risk jeopardizing the role of the
sacred in the lives and aspirations of citizens. And without the
sacred, we risk becoming-in the true sense of the term-a culture
of disbelief.

